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CONGRESS is now considering a revision of that portion of the Bank-
ruptcy Act ' covering the major area of ordinary bankruptcy, corporate
reorganization, and arrangements. This area was revised by the Chand-
ler Act of 1938,2 after approximately six years of study by bankruptcy
specialists and two years of study by Congress.3 In that constructive
effort the National Bankruptcy Conference played a leading role by
coordinating and articulating technical bankruptcy thought. Undoubt-
edly more study, experience, and careful draftsmanship went into the
Chandler Act than into any other amendatory bankruptcy bill, and
that Act was and has continued to be a fine tribute to both Congress
and the Conference. After a ten-year interim the Conference has again
undertaken an extensive revision of the Act and Congressmen Reed
arid Hobbs have quite properly responded by sponsoring bills to effec-
tuate that objective.4 Both the Congress and the Conference are to be
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
t Graduate Fellow, Yale Law School.
1. 30 STAT. 544 (1893), as amended 11 U.S.C. (1940), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A.
(Supp. 1947). Hereinafter cited by section only.
2. 52 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11, 21-9, 32, 33, 35, 41-52, 54, 55, 67, 63, 65-
70, 72-Si, 91-6, 101-12, 501-676, 701-99, 801-926, 1001-S0, 1026, 1101-3 (1940). The
Chandler Act amended §§ 1-11, 14, 15, 17-29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37-42, 44-53, and 55-72. Sec-
tions 12, 13, 73, 74, 77A and 77B were amended and incorporated as Chapters X-XIIL 52
STAT. 840 (1938). Two slight changes were made in § 75. Id. at 939. Section 76 was
repealed. Id. at 940. Chapter X was renumbered Chapter IX and a new subdivision 83
added. Id. at 939. Chapter XIV on Maritime Commission Liens was added. Id. at 938.
3. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1937).
4. For a summary of this legislation see pp. 685-6 infra, and notes 12-17 infra.
The National Bankruptcy Conference, organized in 1932, is composed of representa-
tives of the National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy, the American Bar Associa-
tion, the Commercial Law League of America, the National Association of Credit Men,
the American Bankers Association, and the American Institute of Accountants, as well
as otherwise unaffiliated lawyers and law professors. The Conference has been con-
tinually active since the time of its formation in investigating and formulating improve-
ments in bankruptcy law. In addition to playing a leading role in the preparation of the
Chandler Act of 1938, the Conference collaborated in the revision of the General Orders
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congratulated for undertaking a re-examination of the Act and its func-
tioning. Legislation, like court rules, demands a continuing attention
to the end that ambiguities may be removed, structural defects cured,
and new problems faced.
But basic structural changes should be made only where the propo-
nents clearly establish the need, and major revisions should not be hur-
ried through Congress. A case in point is the promulgation and sub-
sequent revision of the Federal Rules. The Rules were formulated over
a period comparable to the incubation time of the Chandler Act, were
the cooperative product of many specialists, and became operative at
almost the precise time in 1938 as the Chandler Act., Amendments to
the Federal Rules have just become effective,' but a five year study by
the Advisory Committee, the Bench and the Bar preceded their pro-
mulgation; even more significantly, the amendments made no basic
changes, since the need for alteration was not clearly demonstrated.
Comparable care is equally imperative in dealing with the complex
Bankruptcy Act, and, here too, the proponent of basic change should
clearly establish the need."
Since the Chandler Act of 1938 the major developments in the field
of bankruptcy and reorganization are several. The enactment of the
Referee's Salary Bill,7 following several years of study and debate,
properly incorporated the referees into the federal judiciary as salaried
employees of the government, increased their term of office, and gen-
erally strengthened their tenure. This decided gain was made without
and Official Forms in Bankruptcy by the Supreme Court in 1939, collaborated with
representatives of the Attorney General's Committee on Bankruptcy Administration in the
preparation of the bill which was enacted as the Referee's Salary Act (see note 7 infra),
and has prepared other bills now pending before Congress. The present members of the
Conference's Drafting Committee are Jacob I. Weinstein, Chairman, Peter B. Olney,
ex officio (Chairman of the Conference), Watson B. Adair, Carl D. Friebolin, Fred H.
Kruse, James A. McLaughlin, W. Randolph Montgomery and John Gerdes.
Also pending or recently enacted are, among others, an act relating to railroad re-
organization, e.g., Pub. L. No. 478, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (April 9, 1948) ; and competing
bills on agricultural composition and extensions, the McCarran-Lemke bill, H.R. 463, 80th
Cong., 1 Sess. (1947), and a bill prepared by the National Bankruptcy Conference and in-
troduced by Congressman Reed, H.R. 2451, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). See Comment,
56 YALE L. J. 982 (1947). Because of the specialized nature of these fields and their
severability from the other provisions of the Act, we confine this article to the area
covered by the Chandler Act of 1938.
5. The Chandler Act became effective on September 22, 1938, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on September 16. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 21 (14th ed., Moore
and Oglebay, 1941), hereinafter cited as COLLIER; 3 MoonE, FEDERAL PRAcrMCE 3447
(1938).
6. FE. R. Civ. P. 86.
7. 60 STAT. 323 (1946), 11 U.S.C.A. §§62, 63, 65, 67(b), 68, 71, 79(2), 79(5),
80(a), 81, 82 (repealed), i02(a), 102(b), 104(a), 112, 517, 1024(3), 1033(2), 1059(1),
1059 (3) (Supp. 1947). SeeThe Administrative Office Reports to the Conference, 21 J.N.A,
REF. BANKR. 90 (1947).
[Vol. 57 : 683
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS
changing the underlying policy that bankruptcy administration must
pay its own way out of the estates liquidated and reorganized.
The major contribution by the Supreme Court was in two fields:
reorganization and preferences. In reorganization, the Court resolved
the conflict in theory between corporate reorganization under Chapter
X and corporate arrangements under Chapter XI. Corporations of
substantial size with publicly held securities may not use Chapter XI,
the Court ruled, even though literally within its terms, because their
reorganization should be subject to the safeguards of Chapter X and
because Chapter XI's ban on interference with stockholders' interests
forestalls achievement of fair and equitable arrangements." The other
judicial contribution to reorganization regulation was to establish that
valuation must be based upon a fair capitalization of prospective earn-
ings,9 and that the absolute priority rule must be carefully and faith-
fully followed for a reorganization plan to be considered fair and equit-
able. 10 The Court's addition to the law of preference was the Carn Rx-
change National Bank v. Klauder decision," which faithfully applied
Section 60 to hold that a secret lien given for a present consideration
was to be tested as of the subsequent time when it became perfected;
so tested it was a transfer for an antecedent debt, and because of insol-
vency was preferential. The Court recognized that present Section 60
is designed to protect general creditors against secret liens; to that end
a secret lien, whether given for a present or antecedent consideration,
is functionally equivalent to no lien. When the cloak of secrecy is shed,
then, as to general creditors, the security becomes a lien for the first
time and is to be tested for its preferential qualities at that time. If a
lender wants to advance money to a debtor and obtain valid security
he may do so by simply exposing his security at that time to the day-
light. The bona fide purchaser test effectively defines daylight.
The proposed revision of the Act has been cut up into a number of
bills.' 2 Two are aimed at destroying the Klauder rule. The American
8. Secbrities and Exchange Comm'n v. United States Realty & Improvement Co.,
310 U.S. 434 (1940).
9. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 318 U.S.
523 (1943); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); 6
CoLLIER 11.05.
10. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); 6 CounM
11.06.
11. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
12. The A.B.A. bill to amend §60, H.R. 2412, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), in-
troduced by Congressman Reed on March 6, 1947, is a precursor of the Conference
revision. While adopting the A.B.A. bill verbatim with two minor changes, the Con-
ference incorporated it into a fairly comprehensive revision of the entire act, which
included a federal accounts receivable filing act as new § 70i. In addition, the Con-
ference drafted a bill substantially repealing the Borah Act. A committee print, with
analyses of these bills by members of the Conference instrumental in their drafting wvas
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Bar Association bill does that and nothing more." The Conference
bill also does that as to Section 60, but attempts to retrieve some lost
ground as applied solely to accounts receivable by proposing a new
Section 70i for federal recordation of this security device-the require-
ments of which go beyond the rule of the Klauder case. 14 The Confer-
ence also proposes three other measures: (1) a tax bill that substantially
alters the present status of tax claims in bankruptcy; 11 (2) a bill to
repeal the Borah Act interdiction of fee-fixing agreements; 11 and (3) a
bill that rather extensively amends the bankruptcy, corporate reor-
ganization, and arrangement chapters. 7 This last bill is largely clarify-
ing and on the whole non-controversial. Its main defect is that it does
not put forward all the amendments that are needed. The other bills
are ill advised, with the bills to amend Section 60 leading the list.
SECTION 60 AND ITS ATTACKERS
The Bankruptcy Act aims at an equitable distribution of unencum-
bered assets among the general creditors. In determining what are
unencumbered assets and who are entitled to share them, the general
point of cleavage is, of course, the date when the bankruptcy proceed-
ing is initiated. But it is obvious that, if the debtor and certain of his
favored and diligent creditors could with impunity deal with his assets
up to bankruptcy, only tag ends and remnants of unencumbered assets
would remain for the general creditors. Bankruptcy would be only a
procedure to rubber-stamp a liquidation already made. To prevent this
the Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee varied powers that enable him to
reach back and undo much of the debtor-creditor liquidation. The
trustee's power to attack preferences is the heart of bankruptcy law,
for it is only in bankruptcy that the unsecured creditor generally has
prepared. Committee Print, Analysis Printed for Use of the Commiitec on the Jvdiidary,
House of Representatives, 80th Congress (N.B.C., mimeographed, 1948), hereinafter
cited as N.B.C. Committee Print. The proposed Conference bill for the revision of the
Bankruptcy Act was divided into three bills, H.R. 5693, H.R. 5829, and H.R. 5834,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). The bill to repeal the Borah Act was introduced separately,
H.R. 5828, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). The Conference bills were introduced in March,
1948. See Notes 14-17 inlra.
13. H.R. 2412, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), introduced by Congressman Reed on
March 6, 1947.
14., H.R. 5834, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), introduced by Congressman Hobbs on
March 16, 1948.
15. H.R. 5829, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), introduced by Congressman Reed on
March 11, 1948.
16. H.R. 5828, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), introduced by Congressman Reed on
March 11, 1948.




any relief against preferential transfers.' 8 And one of the driving forces
behind the Chandler Act was the conviction, born of long experience,
that the trustee's power to avoid preferences should be materially
strengthened. Accordingly Section 60 was revised extensively in 1938.
The first sentence of present Section 60a states that:
"A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of
the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or
on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such
debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing
by or against him of the petition in bankruptcy, or of the orig-
inal petition under Chapters X, XI, XII, or XIII of this Act,
the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other credi-
tor of the same class."
This definition did not state any new principles. Both the American
Bar Association and the Conference bills, which propose to revise Sec-
tion 60, acquiesce in its propriety.' The crux of the problem is, how-
ever, when shall the transfer be deemed made, i.e., subjected to the
test of the accepted principles. A system of bankruptcy could deal
with this matter in a number of ways. (1) The rule could be that no
transaction is preferential unless it is so at the time the transfer is in
fact made. (2) Or, while still testing the other preferential qualities of
the transfer as in (1), the running of the four-month period could be
tolled until some notoriety is given to the transfer. Although stronger
than (1), this test would never interdict a transfer for a present consid-
eration. (3) Finally, all of the elements of a preferential transfer could
be tested as of the time of notoriety, except the greater percentage
element, with this tested as of bankruptcy.2o Thd Chandler Act adopted
this last rule and defined notoriety in a most effective manner by
treating the transfer as made when perfected as against both a creditor
and a bona fide purchaser. The latter, the bona fide purchaser test,
reversed a forty-year trend of judicial decisions. Until 1938 the trus-
tee's power to avoid preferences was impaired by the judicial doctrine of
18. While state law sometimes gives relief against preferences (3 CoILrun 160.65, 4
Id. 102, 70.88), the truth of the proposition stated in the text has long been recognized by
so able a scholar as Professor McLaughlin of Harvard (testimony before House Commit-
tee on Judiciary, Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 120 (1937)), who was most active in securing the enactment of §60 of the Chandler
Act and now, oddly enough, is one of its main detractors.
19. Both bills substitute the phrase, "petition initiating a proceeding under this Act,"
for the more cumbersome language, "petition in bankruptcy, or of the original petition
under Chapters X, XI, XII, or XIII of this Act." This is the only proposed change in
the first sentence of § 60a.
20. Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227 (1936).
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"relation back," which permitted the perfection of a secret security at
any time prior to bankruptcy to relate back to the time of the actual
transfer in determining whether the transfer was made for an anteced-
ent debt. If originally given for a consideration then present, the trans-
fer was not preferential. 2 1 Yet these secret liens were just as injurious
to general creditors as if the debtor had made a transfer for an anteced-
ent debt at the time the lien became public. Certainly no one would
forthrightly allow the debtor or any creditor to prescribe the order of
distribution of an estate in bankruptcy, yet this was in effect accom-
plished by the debtor and certain of his creditors through the use of
secret sequrity devices. Congress tried in 1903, in 1910, and again in
1926 to require the preferential qualities of the transfer to be tested as
of the time it becafine public.2 2 Each time the Supreme Court disre-
garded the legislative intent. 23 At last the Chandler Act adopted the
unequivocal bona fide purchaser test, and, after some misconstruction
in the lower courts,24 the Supreme Court in the Klauder decision of
1943 gave the new Section 60a its intended effect: a secret lien is
functionally equivalent to no lien.25 Now after this victory following
a forty-odd year struggle come the ABA and the Conference bills to
reverse the Klauder rule.
This retrogression is a product of two factors: alarm, and a partial
surrender to secret financing. "Think of the effect on business," we are
admonished by certain commentators, "if the headlines of the Wall
Street Journal this morning proclaimed: Supreme Court Voids all Secur-
ity Devices as Bankruptcy Preferences." 2 This catastrophe, it is said,
is sure to fall upon us unless the Klauder rule is repudiated. Accus-
tomed as we are to dire and woeful predictions, this one is colossal.
Reserving discussion of the Klauder case until we treat the subject of
accounts receivable, with which it dealt, we think it a pixilated flight
of fancy to fear that the Justice with conservative banking experience
who wrote the Klauder opinion, would father a rule invalidating all
21. McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARV. L. REV. 233, 236-45
(1946); 3 COLIER 60.37.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. And see Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 438
(1943): ". . . for thirty-five years Congress has consistently reached out to strike down
secret transfers, and the courts have with equal consistency found its efforts faulty or
insufficient to that end."
24. E.g., Associated Seed Growers, Inc. v. Geib, 125 F.2d 683 (C.C.A. 4th 1942);
Adams v. City Bank & Trust Co., 115 F.2d 453 (C.C.A.Sth 1940).
25. Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
26. Keeffe, Kelly, and Lewis, Sick Sixty: A Proposed Revision of Section 60A of
the Bankruptcy Act, 33 CORN. L. Q. 99 (1947) (italics in original); see also Ireton,
A Proposal to Amend Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, A6 Co"y. RaoRo. 257, 264
(1947): "The assignment of accounts receivable as a means of secured credit is also
practically eliminated by the present 60a.",
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security devices. The other factor, a partial acquiescence in secret fi-
nancing, is the real answer. Borrowers and lenders have never liked to
make their transactions public if they could otherwise protect them-
selves. Immediately after the Klauder decision, persons lending on the
security of assigned accounts receivable set out to change the law con-
ceming accounts receivable in many states. - At the same time change
in Section 60 was demanded.28 The American Bar Association obliged
with its bill. Ironically, the Conference bill, also originally engen-
dered by the same sources and also duplicating the ABA attack upon
Section 60, hits one aspect of secret financing, assignment of accounts
receivable, with a vengeance in another way.
Neither the ABA nor the Conference proposal would, of course, im-
munize all secret liens. But both bills constitute a partial surrender to
secret financing by quibbling with notoriety. The second and last sen-
tence of present Section 60a reads:
"For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a
transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the time when
it became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the
debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any
rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of
the transferee therein, and, if such transfer is not so perfected
prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or of the orig-
inal petition under chapter X, XI, XII, or XIII of this Act, it
shall be deemed to have been made immediately before bank-
ruptcy."
In lieu of this simple and rather straightforward creditor and bona
fide purchaser test, the ABA and Conference bills put forward a ver-
27. This pressure resulted in legislation in twenty-nine states. See note 42 infra.
See also Koessler, Assigninent of Accounts Receivable: Confusion of the Present Law,
Impact of the Bankruptcy Act and the Need For Uniform Legislation, 33 CaM. L.
REv. 40 (1945); Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-Arotification Finaneing of
Accounts Receivable, 44 McH. L. Ray. 563 (1946); Douglas, Assigned Accounts as
Affected by Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act and the Provisions of State Law uith
Reference Thereto, 19 J.N.A. RiF. BxAN. 11 (1944). For a discussion of the need for
state legislation and arguments in favor of and against validation and recording statutes
see A CA BAR AssocrA'nox, Srcnox or CoaRoPATiozb, BAuxuixr AND [CANIM.LE
LAw, Proceedings at Chicago Meeting 15-30 (1944).
28. See Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems Under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy
Act, 43 CoL L. REV. 58, 69-72 (1943) ; Foreword by Hanna to Koessler, Assignment of
Accounts Receivable: Confusion of the Present La-,t, Impact of the Banbruptcy Act ard
the Need for Uniform Legislation, 33 CALiF. L. Rnv. 40 (1945). Anticipating the result
reached in the Klauder case, the Chicago Bar Association early recommended alteration
of § 60. Glenn, Bankruptcy Liquidations, AivmcAN BAn AssocATIo., Swcrxo, or CoMx-
=cmI LAw, Proceedings at San Francisco feeting 50, 60 (1939). A" amendment ex-
cepting assignments of accounts from the provisions of § 6 wvas proposed in 1940, S.
3554, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940); 3 CoLurm 972.
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bose, complex lien cieditor test. This test which would at once have
astonished and delighted Gilbert and Sullivan is set forth in the note.2"
A superficially plausible argument advanced in favor of it as a sole
29. Paragraph 60a(2)-(3) of the Conference bill is here set out. Matter added to the
ABA bill by the Conference bill appears in italics. Words omitted in the Conference bill
are bracketed. In other respects the perfection tests of the two bills are identical and
read as follows:
"(2) For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, and subject to the
provisions of paragraph (3), a transfer shall be deemed to have been made or suffered
at the time when it became so far perfected that no creditor obtaining under applicable
law by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract a lien on such property with-
out a special priority (whether or not such a creditor exists), could acquire, after such
perfection, any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the trans-
feree therein, and, if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the filing of the [original]
petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, it shall be deemed to have been made im-
mediately before the filing of such [original] petition: Provided, however, that where
real property is transferred for or on account of an antecedent debt, the transfer shall
be deemed to have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no bona
fide purchaser from the debtor could acquire, after such perfection, any rights in the
property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein. The rights that
such a lien creditor or bona fide purchaser codd acquire shall include the rights acquired
by the mere fact of obtaining such a lien or making such a purchase, and any further
rights that might be obtained by recording any document, or giving notice to any person,
or taking any step wholly within the control of such a liet holder or tnrchaser, with or
without the aid. of ministerial action by public offlicials, but such creditor's or pnrchaser's
rights shall exclude those acquired by any acts or transactions subsequent to his obtain-
ing such a lien or making such a purchase which require the agreement or concurrence
of any third party, or which require any further judicial ruling.
"(3) A transfer, wholly or in part, for or on account of a new and contemporaneous
consideration shall, to the extent of such consideration and interest thereon and the other
obligations of the transferor connected therewith, be deemed to be made or suffered at the
time of the transfer, unless the applicable law requires the transfer to be perfected by
recording, delivery or otherwise, in order that no creditor described in paragraph (2)
could acquire, after such perfection, any rights in the property so transferred superior to
the rights of the transferee therein. A transfer to secure a future loan, if such loan is
actually made, or a transfer which becomes security for a future loan, shall have the same
effect as a transfer for or on account of a new and contemporaneous consideration. If any
requirement specified in this paragraph (3) exists, the time of the transfer shall be de-
termined by the following rules:
"I. Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of time of not more
than thirty days after the transfer within which recording, delivery, or some other
act is required, and compliance therewith is had within such stated period of time;
or where (B) the applicable law specifies no such stated period of time or where
such stated period of time is more than thirty days, and compliance therewith is had
within thirty days after the transfer, the transfer shall be deemed to be made or
suffered at the time of the transfer.
"II. Where compliance with the law applicable to the transfer is not had in ac-
cordance with the provisions of subparagraph I, the transfer shall be deemed to be
made or suffered at the time of compliance therewith, and if such compliance is not
had prior to the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, such




test and against retention of the bona fide purchaser test is this: since
the trustee represents general creditors, the type of perfection that
should be used is that which would render the transfer immune against
attack by a general creditor armed with attachment or other similar
judicial lien; the bona fide purchaser test, it is accordingly contended,
transcends the proper scope of bankruptcy by subverting property
rights established by state law.A0 This argument ignores the fundamen-
tal difference between the function of state laws regarding creditors'
rights and the function of a bankruptcy act. State laws are designed
primarily for individual creditor action, with the race to the swift.
Bankruptcy, on the other hand, is a proceeding for creditors collectively
and aims at an equitable distribution among this group. The theory
behind giving the trustee greater powers to avoid transfers and recover
assets than any creditor would have under state law is as old as the
Bankruptcy Act itself; although the extent to which the theory has been
exploited has varied from time to time, the trend has constantly been
toward greater power in the trustee. Section 67a empowers the trustee
to avoid judicial liens obtained against the property of the insolvent
debtor within four months of his bankruptcy. This is in complete de-
fiance of state law promoting the individual creditor's right to a valid
judicial lien. The Bankruptcy Act has in Section 67d provided its own
standards relative to fraudulent transfers, and is substantially the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act adopted by Congress for bank-
ruptcy purposes. The trustee can by virtue of Section 67d avoid trans-
fers as fraudulent regardless of whether a creditor could do so under
local law; particularly in a state which does not have the Uniform Act,
the divergence between what the trustee can avoid and what the credi-
tor can attack is quite marked. Section 70c gives the trustee, as of
bankruptcy, the status of an ideal lien creditor as to all property in the
possession of the bankrupt, and the status of a judgment creditor hold-
ing an execution returned unsatisfied as to all other property. No un-
secured creditors occupy the former status and not all of them occupy
the latter. Section 70e allows the trustee to avoid any transfer which
is voidable under applicable state law by a creditor having a claim prov-
able in bankruptcy, and under the doctrine of Moorev. Bay3" the trustee's
quantum of recovery is not limited by the creditor's rights. Thus if a
lien is partially voidable by a creditor it is totally voidable for the bene-
fit of the estate by the trustee. And, finally, the whole philosophy
behind Section 60 has always been and is, even under the proposed
revisions, to give the trustee the power to avoid certain transactions
denominated as preferential although no creditor could attack them
30. Foreword by Hanna to Koessler, op. cit. mspra note 28, at 40; Hanna, Prcfcrces
in Bankruptcy, 15 U. oF CHL. L. REv. 311, 315, 319-20 (1943); Glenn, Mercantile Col-
laferal Lae-Recent Developments, 21 J. N. A. RE P. BANlM.. 24 (1946).
31. 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
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under state law. Congress has the power to determine, and has always
exercised independence in judging, how far the trustee should be al-
lowed to go in derogation of the rights obtained by a creditor under
state law; 32 there is no reason to scuttle the bona fide purchaser test
because it gives the trustee greater avoiding powers than a general
creditor would have under state law.
Under the proposed Gilbert and Sullivan lien creditor test it will
again be possible in many jurisdictions for the debtor and a favored
creditor to use a secret security interest to achieve the same result they
achieved before 1938. As subsequently pointed out, the ABA bill goes
even further by immunizing, as against the trustee, secret assignments
of accounts receivable in several jurisdictions where such assignments
can now be avoided by the trustee under the bona fide purchaser test.
As to accounts receivable, the Conference bill retrieves some ground
by adding a federal accounts receivable filing act to Section 70, to be
applicable in all jurisdictions which do not require filing records of such
assignments.3
Accounts Receivable
As previously noted, the notion that Section 60a should be radically
revised was conceived in the field of financing on assigned accounts
receivable. The Supreme Court's decision in the Klauder case 11 was
said to threaten all security devices. But let's turn to the record and
32. See Martin, Substantive Reguilation of Security Devices Under the Bankruptcy
Power, 48 CoL- L. Rxv. 62 (1948) passim; Oglebay, Proposed Revision of Seciio 60a
of the Bankruptcy Act: Step Backward, 21 J. N. A. REF. BANICR. 54, 57 (1947).
33. See pp. 695-6 infra.
The Conference bill also proposes revision of subdivision c of § 70, commonly known
as the "strong arm" provision, in a manner which is unwieldy and perhaps dangerous
both to the bankruptcy trustee and to third persons. Present subdivision c gives the
trustee (1) the status of a judicial lien creditor as to property in the possession of the
bankruptcy court; and (2) the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor, with
execution returned unsatisfied, as to all other property. The Conference bill would
eliminate this distinction between property in possession and property not in possession
of the bankruptcy court and give the trustee the status of a judicial lien creditor as to
both classes. Present § 70c states an understandable principle as to property in the pos-
session of the bankruptcy court by treating bankruptcy as an "equitable" attachment of
that property; and also states an understandable principle as to other property by giving
the trustee the status of an ideal creditor for proceeding to recover that property. Thus
if the trustee wants to contend that the bankrupt has made a conveyance that is fraudu-
lent by the standards of either § 67d or § 70e, he is armed by § 70c with the rights,
remedies and powers of a judgment creditor with execution returned unsatisfied and hence
is ready to attack. His comparable status under the proposed revision is far from clear.
On the other hand persons who deal in good faith with the transferee are placed in an
ambiguous position. So far as they are concerned the bankruptcy of the transferee's
grantor is no caveat, yet the proposed revision seems to state that the trustee has a lien
upon the transferee's property. Creation of this type of fictional lien is undesirable.
34. Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
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look at the facts of that case. As usual the debtor was in failing circum-
stances; in this case it had been for two years. It borrowed money and
concurrently assigned receivables as security. The assignments in ques-
tion were all made within four months of the debtor's bankruptcy, and
one only six days before bankruptcy. When the assignments were made
they were recorded on the debtor's books. This was all the notoriety
given to the security transactions, and thus they followed the pattern
of secrecy so common in bankruptcy. Under Pennsylvania law, which
applied in determining when the transfers were perfected, the assign-
ments were good as against creditors when made. If the trustee was to
prevail, it had to be by virtue of the bona fide purchaser test, i.e., that
a subsequent good faith assignee could acquire a better title than the
first assignee who had loaned the money to the debtor. There are three
common-law rules governing the validity of such assignments as be-
tween the first and a subsequent assignee: (1) The English rule, fol-
lowed in some states, allows the assignee who first notifies the ac-
count debtor to prevail. 35 (2) The New York rule validates the assign-
ment in favor of the first assignee, regardless of notification." (3) The
Massachusetts rule, adopted by the Restatement of Contracts, allows the
first assignee to prevail, unless the subsequent assignee collects or ob-
tains a novation from, or a judgment against, the account debtor, or
receives a document embodying the obligation. These exceptions are
sometimes known as the "four horsemen." -1 Pennsylvania followed the
English rule. The Supreme Court, affirming the Third Circuit,-s held
that since a subsequent assignee, i.e., a bona fide purchaser, who noti-
fied could prevail under Pennsylvania law, the assignments had not
been perfected prior to bankruptcy, and as tested by Section 60a were
for antecedent debts and preferential. Any other decision would' not
have effected the purpose of Section 60a to force notoriety of security
transactions.
The second and other case supporting the brief for revision is In re
Vardaman Shoe Co., '9 a district court decision. The initial problem was
whether Illinois or Missouri law applied to the assignments, which
followed the familiar pattern of the Klauder case. The assignor's books
had been marked, but the account debtor had not been notified. While
the contracts of assignment stipulated that Illinois law was to govern,
at least some of the contracts were executed in Missouri. This state
followed the English rule, which the Supreme Court had applied in the
35. Dearie v. Hail, 3 Russ. & M,. 1 (Ch. 1S27) ; Comment, 57 YALE L J. 823, 846, nn.
81,82 (1948).
36. Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N.Y. 277, 41 N.E. 572 (1895).
37. RzSTATE,,lEN, CoNTcrs § 173 (1932) ; Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Fi-
nance Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924); Comment, 33 YAmu L. J. 767 (1924).
38. In re Quaker City Sheet Metal Co., 129 F.2d S94 (C.C.A. 3d 1942).
39. 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943).
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Klauder decision. Under Illinois law creditors could not reach assigned
accounts, and notification of the account debtor 'was immaterial in
determining the rights of successive assignees; but whether the first
assignee's right was absolute (rule [2] above) or whether the subsequent
assignee could prevail by meeting one of the conditions of the "four
horsemen" (rule [3] above) was not clear in Illinois. The court conceded
the applicability of Illinois law for purposes of the decision and, further,
assumed that the "four horsemen" rule prevailed in that state. Since
a subsequent assignee, or bona fide purchaser, could have prevailed by
meeting one of the four conditions of that rule, the trustee was allowed
to prevail. The actual result in the case may have been correct as to
the assignments executed in Missouri. But even if Illinois law applied,
and the "four horsemen" rule was the law in that state, the court never-
theless misapplied the bona fide purchaser test by expanding the test
to that of a purchaser who had not only bought in good faith but had
done some further act requiring the concurrence of a third party or the
judgment of a court.
The Vardaman case was discredited sub silentio in In re Rosen 41 in
an able opinion by Judge Goodrich, writing for the same court that had
been affirmed in the Klauder case. Judge Goodrich declined to decide
whether the applicable state law embodied the "four horsemen" rule,
and held that even if it did the trustee could not prevail over the as-
signee of the accounts: ". . . the favored position acquired by the sub-
sequent assignee . .. [under the "four horsemen" rule] comes not from
his status as a bona fide purchaser, but from his activities following his
belated assignment." 41
Since the trustee's right to avoid secret assignments as preferences
depends upon the applicable state law on perfection, the right varies
from state to state. The rule applied in the Klavder case has resulted
in a spate of state legislation regulating the assignment of receivables. 2
Fifteen states have enacted "validation acts," adopting the New York
rule validating assignments in favor of the first assignor as against both
creditors and subsequent assignees, thereby terminating the operation
of the Klauder rule. Other states have adopted recording or filing acts,
which make compliance with their provisions a prerequisite to the valid-
ity of assigned accounts as against either bona fide purchasers or credi-
tors; under these acts the Klauder rule has vitality. Two states have
40. 157 F.2d 997 (C.C.A. 3d 1946), affirming 66 F. Supp. 174 (D.N.J. 1946),
cert. denied sub nor. Fisch v. Standard Factors Corp. 330 U.S. 835 (1947).
41. Id. at 1001.
42. For summaries and discussions of this state legislation see Comment, 57 YALE
L. 3. 828, 849-50 (1948) ; Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable: Confusion of the
Present Law, Impact of the Bankruptcy Act and the Need For Uniform Legislalion, 33
CALiF. L. REv. 40 (1945) ; Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing
of Accounts Receivable, 44 Mica. L. REv. 563 (1946).
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adopted book-marking statutes requiring the fact of assignment to be
marked on the assignor's books as a condition to validity; subject to
this slight obeisance, the K/auder rule is terminated. In some states
which have no applicable legislation, the status of assignments of ac-
counts is not clear.
Under the ABA bill to revise Section 60a, secret financing on assigned
receivables will be immune except in those states in which a garnishing
creditor of the assignor can prevail over the assignee.43 The same is
true under the Conference revision of Section 60a. Despite the fact
that the impetus behind revision of Section 60 stems from the Kkauder
decision, and although the Conference is cooperating with the ABA to
eliminate the case's principles from the broad field of preferences, the
Conference bill preserves and fortifies the Klauder rule in just the field
of the assignment of receivables, by proposing a federal accounts re-
ceivable filing act as a new Section 70i. If state law provides for public
filing of notices of assignments, no additional filing is necessary under
Section 70i; but wherever state law does not so provide, the assignee
must file a notice of assignment with the clerk of the federal district
court within a stated time. The assignment is invalid against the trus-
tee where there is no compliance with the filing provisions.
Various arguments pro and con have been advanced. In support of
non-notification financing it is urged that because of the opprobrium
connected with borrowing on accounts, publicity for such borrowing
will injure the business man who secures credit in this way; that defi-
niteness of description for recording purposes is difficult; and that the
creditor can always secure accurate information from a financial state-
ment.4 4 This view has gained considerable currency: some fifteen states
have enacted validation statutes since the Klauder decision; and ap-
parently the American Bar Association subscribes to it, for its bill,
limited solely to Section 60, immunizes receivable financing in most
states from the preference provision. Advocates of recording statutes
insist that experience has shown that publicity for accounts receivable
financing reflects but does not injure the borrower's credit standing;
and that accurate information of assignments of accounts should be
avalable for public inspection, as in the case of other security trans-
actions, for public records are more reliable than the borrower's state-
ments.45 Since filing statutes have been successfully employed, it is
43. Few states allow garnishing creditors to prevail over an assignee at common
law. State recordation statutes, however, protect creditors as well as subsequent as-
signees. Comment, 57 Y=I L. J. 828, 850 (1948).
44. Hanna, supra note 28, at 69; A,,mnncAx Be AssoCATmON Srwco:i ou Cono-
RATioN BANKING AND MmeRCANTmE LAW, supra note 27, at 17-8; Comment, 44 YArn L. J.
639 (1935).
45. AmCAN BA AssocIATIoN SEcTION ON CORPORATI0N, BANKING AND M nCANr-
TH.E LAW, supra note 27, at 19; Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 28, 834 n. 28, 847 n. 92 (1948).
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argued that sufficiently definite description of the assigned accounts is
possible.4 1 While such an eminent authority as Professor Glenn con-
tends that each state should be left to deal with the problem as it sees
fit and that imposition of substantive uniformity by the Bankruptcy
Act is unjustified, 47 for reasons previously stated an equitable distribu-
tion often demands that bankruptcy override local law; here it must
do so to prevent the last liquid assets of the estate from being secretly
encumbered.
Proposed Section 70i seems grounded upon the theory of preference
in that it requires the notice to be filed within ten days of the assign-
ment-that done, the security is treated as presently given; or filed
before the assignor became insolvent, or more than four months before
bankruptcy.48 Yet the proposal departs from the theory of voidable
preferences stated in Section 60b, which requires the trustee to show
that the preferee had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent, by allowing the trustee to invalidate any assignment that is
not filed within the stated time. Whether the requirement of present
Section 60b should be retained is debatable,4a but if it is, why should it
be omitted from proposed Section 70i which is in effect a preference
section aimed solely at one security device?
The proposal also apparently contemplates the validity, as against
the trustee, of contracts to assign future receivables, for it speaks of
the date when "the assignment is made or the agreement to assign is
entered into." The present rule under Section 60, which was the better
view even before the Chandler Act, is that an assignment made within,
but pursuant to an agreement to assign made before, the four-month
period prior to bankruptcy, is a transfer for an antecedent debt and a
voidable preference if the other necessary elements exist."n The reason
for changing this rule or adding a cumulative rule that diverges from
it is not apparent. But on the whole the provisions of Section 70i re-
quiring notoriety in every state for the assignment of accounts is an
improvement in the present law under which secret financing on receiv-
ables is still possible in many states.
46. The fact that both validation and recording statutes have operated successfully
outside bankruptcy can perhaps be explained by the recent suggestion that duplicate as-
signments are so rare among business men as to have little economic significance. Martin,
supra note 32, at 82.
47. Glenn, supra note 30.
48. The proposed amendment leaves unsettled the rights of the trustee against an
assignment recorded within ten days but made to secure an antecedent debt within four
months of bankruptcy while the assignor is insolvent.
49. See 3 CoLLmR 989.
50. Grandison v. National Bank of Commerce, 231 Fed. 800 (C.C.A. 2d 1916), cert.




Until 1938 it was possible for the holder of an equitable lien-i.e., a
secret lien created in equity to further the parties' intent to create a
specific interest in identified property-to prevail over the trustee by
recording or taking possession immediately before bankruptcy." And
even where the equitable lienor had not taken one of these steps he pre-
vailed against the trustee in any state where an equitable lienor's status
excelled that of a lien creditor.5 2 A debtor's financial distress often re-
mained undisclosed; a large creditor could be induced to refrain from en-
forcing his claim or even to extend further credit on the assurance that
in case of bankruptcy his claim would be paid in full as "secured"; this
gentlemen's agreement remained secret until the eve of bankruptcy.
The result was that other creditors were misled into advancing credit
to the failing debtor, and a favored creditor was preferred through col-
lusive assertions, often difficult to disprove, that a lien had been given
before the four-month period. This menace to the scheme of equal dis-
tribution, which the courts had perpetuated in the face of repeated
attempts by Congress to eliminate it, was eradicated by the inclusion
in Section 60 of the bona fide purchaser test. Both the ABA and Con-
ference bills by their lien creditor test reinstate equitable liens in bank-
ruptcy in those states where a lien creditor gets only the rights the
debtor had in the subject matter of the lien: where the equitable lienor
prevails over lien creditors.
53
"Relation Back"for Thirty Days
Where applicable state law allows no period for perfection, or allows
longer than thirty days, the ABA and Conference bills propose a thirty-
day perfection period for transfers made for new and contemporaneous
consideration, with the perfection relating back to the time of the trans-
fer. The pernicious doctrine of "relation back," close kin to the equit-
able lien and with similar potentialities for collusion and overreaching,
is permitted to operate within a one-month period. A secret lien during
the critical month preceding bankruptcy may be as dangerous as any
existing for a longer period; and the time period is far too long. This
sort of legislative detail is usually productive of evil. The courts can
be trusted to apply the present Section 60a so that a transfer and a
subsequent filing, recording, or other perfection, within a time reason-
ably related to the type of security, will be treated together as a con-
tinuing transaction. 54 The diligent and honest transferee has nothing
51. 3 CoLTumE 875-91.
52. See cases cited in Comment, 57 YAmn L. J. 8', 840 n. 49 (1948). The "strong
arm" clause of § 70c gave, and still gives, the trustee the rights of a lien creditor as to
property in the possession of the bankrupt.
53. See cases cited in Comment, 57 YAi L. J. 828, 839 n.47 (1948).
54. See it re Coombs, 37 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Mo. 1940) ; In re McManus Motors,
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to fear from this type of judicial rule. But to determine diligence by
legislative fiat is to invite collusive abuse.
Security Interests in Goods Held by Debtor for Resale
Recently the fear has been expressed that the bona fide purchaser
test will enable the trustee to invalidate properly filed or recorded trust
receipts, factor's liens, chattel mortgages on goods held for resale and
similar legitimate security devices. 55 Since the debtor's purchaser in
the ordinary course of trade can obtain an interest superior to that of
the security holder, even though the latter has given full notoriety to
the transaction,"6 it is said that the trustee, by virtue of the bona fide
purchaser test, can prevail. It is highly improbable that any court
would reach that result. Section 60a should be interpreted in the light
of its legislative history as striking at secret liens, previously protected
by the doctrine of "relation back," not at legitimate security devices
which have been given the full notoriety prescribed by state law, and
which, by their very function, are designed to enable the debtor to have
possession and the power of sale and hence are never perfectible as
against the ordinary purchaser. Nor would the "plain meaning" rule
of interpretation preclude this view, for a distinction can readily be
drawn between the traditional concept of the bona fide purchaser and
that of the buyer in the ordinary course of trade.57 But if in the business
world the fear of another interpretation, unrealized in nearly ten years
of decisions under the Act, is real, then the simple solution is to add a
clause exempting this type of security from the bona fide purchaser
test, and not to recast entire Section 60a.1s The uncertainty which
27 F. Supp. 113 (D. Mass. 1939). Some state courts have recognized enxecution and
recording as a continuous transaction in applying state recording statutes. 32 IowA L.
REv. 760, 764 rL23 (1947).
55. Hanna, op. cit. siupra note 28 at 73; Ireton, op. cit. supra note 26 at 263-5 (1947);
Keeffe, Kelly, and Lewis, op. cit. supra note 26 at 100-3; McLaughlin, op. cit. supra note
21 at 251.
56. E.g., UNiFoRm TRUST R. ns AcT § 9-2(a).
57. Cf. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COL. L. Rrv.
527, 540-5 (1947); UNinoRm TRust Rscn'Prs Acr § 1 (distinguishes between "buyer
in the ordinary course of trade" and "purchaser").
58. The Conference also harbors the fear that courts will test the trustee's right to
prevail by the rights of a creditor with special priority, such as one injured by an auto-
mobile, under a peculiar state law, who has a right against the vehicle, or a government
unit with a tax priority. The ABA and Conference bills accordingly refer to a creditor
"without special priority." McLaughlin, op. cit. supra note 21, at 255-6. This fear is
largely fanciful, but can be allayed by adding a short limiting clause to the present sec-
tion. Similarly the fear that other courts will test the trustee's rights by the rights of a
purchaser or creditor who has done some further act requiring the concurrence of third
parties or the judgment of a court, as did the court in In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F.
Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943) (now discredited, see p. 649 supra), can be put at rest by a
qualifying clause added to the present language.
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would be launched by the proposed statutory language 11 would thus
be avoided as would, more importantly, the evils inherent in weakening
the preference provision by elimination of the bona fide purchaser test.
TAx CLAiAs
A bankrupt's tax liability to the federal or state government is now
unaffected by his discharge under Section 17a(1) or by the confirmation
of an arrangement or plan. Tax liens are also unaffected by bankruptcy,
except those which are on personal property and unaccompanied by
possession, and in this restricted area are only subordinated to admin-
istration expenses and wage claims entitled to priority.c Under Section
64a, which deals with priorities, all current taxes, i.e., taxes which ac-
crue during bankruptcy administration, are entitled to a first priority
as one of the expenses of administration,61 and all taxes which became
due and owing prior to bankruptcy and are not secured by lien have a
fourth priority. Because the expenses accorded a third priority are sel-
dom incurred,62 pre-bankruptcy tax claims are usually payable immedi-
ately after expenses of administration and wage priorities. And pre-
bankruptcy tax claims may accumulate over long periods of time.
Apart from state tax claims, which are barred only by local statutes of
limitations, an example from the federal field will illustrate. The Inter-
nal Revenue Code now allows the Federal Government three years
after a return is filed in which to assess income, estate or gift 13 taxes.
The tax may be collected by distraint or by a proceeding in court begun
within six years of the date of assessment." Upon an adjudication of
bankruptcy all deficiencies must be immediately assessed." Claims un-
59. Compare with the American Bar Association's present position an earlier recom-
mendation: "The law is clear now. The states are deciding rapidly how to adapt their
local law to their particular needs in the light of the Klaudcr case. To amend this part
of the section now will only muddy the waters:' AxnMIcAa" BAa AssocTzo: SErIoN*
OF CoR0RA-mox, BANKING AND MEcANTIL LAw, Proceedings at Cincinnati Meeting.
Report of Committee on Bankruptcy and Liquidations 77-9 (1945).
60. Section 67(c).
61. 3 CoLumR f164.105 n.36.
62. Given a third priority by § 64a(3) are expenses incurred by creditors in suc-
cessfully opposing a discharge or the confirmation of an arrangement or a wage-earner
plan or in collecting evidence which results in the conviction of any person for an offense
under the Act.
63. INT. Rnv. CODE §§275(a), 874(a), 1016(a). The income tax chapter provides
periods other than three years for certain situations. Id. §§275(b), 275(c), 275(d),
275(e), 275(g). Also, the taxpayer and the Commissioner may agree in writing upon a
time for assessment. Id. § 276(b). All three chapters, income, estate and gift tax, provide
that in case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or a failure to file a re-
turn, collection of the tax "may be begun without assessment, at any time." Id. §§ 276(a),
874(b) (1), 1016(b) (1).
64. INT. Rnv. CODE §§276(c), 874(b), 1016(b).
65. Id. §§274(a), 1015(a).
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paid in bankruptcy distribution may be collected by distraint or by
court action sought within six years after the termination of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 61 Thus the Treasury is normally permitted a max-
imum of nine years to assess and collect; if bankruptcy intervenes, an
additional six years, beginning at the termination of the proceeding, is
allowed for a claim unpaid in bankruptcy.
Tax claims, both secured and unsecured, therefore, occupy an excel-
lent position under the present Bankruptcy Act.
Befor turning to the more controversial provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Conference tax bill, one should note two provisions dealing with
the bankrupthy court's power over pre-bankruptcy taxes. Present Sec-
tion 64a(4) provides "that no order shall be made for the payment of
a tax assessed against any property of the bankrupt in excess of the
value of the interest of the bankrupt estate therein as determined by
the court." This is retained intact in the Conference bill. Present Sec-
tion 64a(4) also provides "that, in case any question arises as to the
amount or legality of any taxes, such question shall be heard and deter-
mined by the court." This provision has been emasculated and its
meaning obscured by judicial dicta stemming from a case concerning
post-bankruptcyr taxes, to which Section 64a(4) dealing with pre-bank-
ruptcy taxes clearly does not apply, and further involving railroad re-
organization, to which the applicability of Section 64 in its entirety
is questionable.67 The Conference tax bill wisely proposes to eliminate
the latter provision from Section 64 and would add a paragraph to
Section 2 empowering the court to hear and determine questions "aris-
ing as to the amount or legality of any tax, whether or not previously
assessed, which has not prior to bankruptcy been contested before and
adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent juris-
diction, or, if such question has been so contested and adjudicated and
the time for appeal or review has not expired, to authorize the receiver
or trustee to prosecute such appeal or review." Placed in Section 2,
which deals generally with the powers of courts of bankruptcy, this
salutary provision, which protects the estate from erroneous assess-
ments without unduly shifting all tax determinations into the bank-
ruptcy forum, will be applicable to both pre- and post-bankruptcy
66. Id. §j274(b), 1015(b).
67. Arkansas Corporation Comm'n v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 132 (1941). The case
actually decided that where the tax liability of the estate had been determined by a
judicial or quasi-judicial state tribunal, the bankruptcy court could not review that de-
termination. But the Court's remark to the effect that "there is nothing in the history
of bankruptcy or reorganization legislation to support the theory that Congress intended
to set the federal courts up as super-assessment tribunals over state taxing agencies," id.
at 145, has induced doubts as to whether the decision's application would be limited to
determinations by judicial or quasi-judicial state agencies. And when the question




taxes and to all proceedings under the Act. Thus the scope of present
Section 64a(4) is enlarged and its applicability to railroad and corporate
reorganzations-a presently doubtful matter--clarified.
Under the Conference bill, current taxes are still entitled to a first
priority as expenses of administration, and tax liens will continue to be
unaffected by bankruptcy, except those on personal property, unac-
companied by possession. As to these the principle of present Section
67c is continued for the purpose of subordinating them to the first and
second priorities, but the Conference bill goes further and restricts these
liens in the amount of their payment to claims for taxes which have
become due and owing within one year. The more drastic attack upon
the status of tax claims is, however, this: unsecured tax claims which
have been due and owing for more than one year prior to bankruptcy
are (1) relegated to the status of general unsecured debts and (2) dis-
charged with other claims. Taxes accruing during the year prior to
bankruptcy are not affected by the bill; they continue to have a fourth
priority, and unpaid portions are not released by discharge.
The present bill is not the first attack upon the status of taxes in
bankruptcy. In 1937 the provision in Section 17 exempting federal tax
claims from discharge was deleted in the House version of the Chandler
Bill 6' but was restored by the Senate. 9 Urged also to eliminate the
exemption from discharge of state taxes, the House apparently felt re-
strained by constitutional limitations." The same obstacle troubled
the Conference; although it recognized the desirability of releasing state
tax claims by discharge, it did not then recommend the change.71 But
the basis for the constitutional doubt has been minimized since 1937
by the Supreme Court's repudiation of the cases upon which the doubt
was predicated.7 2 In the light of the Court's present position on state
immunity from federal action,73 and because of the paramount nature
of the bankruptcy power,7 4 state taxes could probably be validly dis-
charged. Indeed, the Conference's comment to the present bill does not
even acknowledge the existence of any constitutional problem.
The Senate, when rejecting the House amendment to the Chandler
bill discharging federal taxes, was influenced by the Treasury's conten-
- 68. H. . REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 67 (1937).
69. 83 CoNG. REc. S684 (1938).
70. Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. S046, 75th Cong., Ist Sess.
67-8 (1937).
71. Id. at 68.
72. Ibid. Congressman Chandler voiced the fear at the hearings, referring to Col-
lector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1870), and Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement
District No. One, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). The former was overruled by Graves v. New
York ex reL O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), and the latter virtually overruled by United
States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. -7 (1938).
73. Cf. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 586 et seq. (1946).
74. See WARExm, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTOy 9, 154-9 (1935).
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tion that discharge of taxes in bankruptcy would permit widespread
tax avoidance,7 5 a contention which the Department has asserted in
opposing later proposals for the discharge of tax claims.76 The Confer-
ence and other critics of the present discharge exception urge that the
debtor's discharge does not now enable him to get a fresh start, since
unpaid tax claims can be collected at any time within six years after
bankruptcy; they argue, moreover, that little income is realized by the
Government from these stale tax claims in any event." The Treasury
has also opposed suggestions that the priority of tax claims be limited
to those which became due and owing within one year prior to bank-
ruptcy on the grounds that the effect of such a limitation would be loss
of needed revenue and imposition on the Treasury of an insurmount-
able handicap to tax administration.' The Conference bill would un-
doubtedly have the latter effect on income tax administration, espe-
cially in view of its provisions that taxes upon or measured by net
income, shall be deemed "due and owing . . . at the time when the
amount of such net income . . . is ascertainable, whether or not it
has been ascertained"; and that tax deficiencies are deemed due and
payable "as of the last day of the tax period to which they relate re-
gardless of the date of assessment." 79 By this definition income taxes
are due and owing on the last day of the calendar or fiscal year, as the
case may be, although returns for that year are not due until two and
one-half months later.8 0 The Treasury would have to assess all income
tax deficiencies within nine and one-half months of the final date on
which returns are due-unless tax liability were admitted by the bank-
rupt-in order to have a non-dischargeable tax claim entitled to a
fourth priority. Statistics showing the speed with which returns are
now processed by the Treasury disclose the impracticability of assessing
all deficiencies within that time."' Even if such speed were possible,
the Government would as a practical matter be able to protect itself
only as to deficiencies which the taxpayer did not choose to dispute. In
determining the tax liability of any sizeable business enterprise dis-
agreements between the taxpayer and the Collector are inevitable. A
taxpayer's exhaustion of the intra-departmental remedies for adjust-
ment of differences would usually leave the Government, although suc-
75. 83 CONG. Rwc. 9106 (1938).
76. See Olive, Taxes in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 25 TAXES 5, 8 (1947).
77. Ibid.
78. Id. at 6-8.
79. These provisions are included in the Conference bill as an amendment to § 1, new
92Y2.
80. INT. REv. CODE § 53(a).
81. ANNUAL REPORT OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 26, 122-7 (1947);
ANNUAL REPORT OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 14-22, 113-7 (1945) ; ANNUAL
REPORT OF SECRETARY OF TREASURY 204-6 (1946).
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cessful, with a claim due and owing for more than one year, 2 and a
taxpayer's election to litigate in fhe Tax Court would invariably have
the same result.83 Such tax claim would be entitled to no priority and
would be dischargeable.
On the other hand there are certain kinds of taxes which are relatively
simple in their operation. Among these are taxes for which the bank-
rupt is a collector for the government, e.g., taxes withheld by the bank-
rupt-employer from his employee's wages, and social security taxes
payable both by him and his employees. The Internal Revenue Code's
provisions for collection of income tax at the source 84 and the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act 81 require the employer to withhold a cer-
tain amount, to be computed as prescribed, from the employee's wages
as and when paid. Every employer must make a return in the month
following the close of each quarter of the calendar year, showing and
remitting the amounts withheld.ss In the case of withheld income tax,
if the employer withholds more than $100 each month, he is required
to pay the funds withheld to a depositary, authorized by the Secretary
of the Treasury, within ten days after the close of each calendar month.8
In administering these taxes and others where computation is simple
and the likelihood of disputed assessments is slight, returns could be
processed within one year from the due date. As applied to taxes of
this nature the Conference bill may well be a workable improvement on
the present law. And where the bankrupt's income had been wholly
or largely subject to withholding, the Government would lose little by
the Conference bill.
The desirability of some sort of limitation on tax priorities in bank-
ruptcy has become increasingly evident in recent years. Under the
82. 9 M arcs, LAw oF Faicas. INco aE TAXAmo0N §§49.P, 49.34, 49.36, 49.33,
49.55, 49.63-77 (1943). Normally, an appreciable period passes before the deficiency is
-discovered. See note 81, supra. The taxpayer is then sent a 30-day letter, giving him 30
days in which to file a protest. If the deficiency is not settled with the Internal Revenue
Agent in charge or, on the taxpayers request, at a hearing before the appropriate office
of the Technical Staff Division, the agent in charge issues a 90-day letter (notice of
deficiency). If the taxpayer is then unable to settle with the Technical Staff Division
he may file an appeal in the Tax Court within that 90 days.
83. Filing an appeal with the Tax Court now suspends the running of the statute
of limitations on assessment and collection. 53 STA'T. 87, INT. RE%. COM § 277 (1940).
84. 57 STAT. 126, INT. REV. CoDE §§ 1621-32 (1943).
85. 53 STAT. 175 (1939), as amended, 53 STAT. 1381 (1939), as amended, INr. Rm,.
CoDo § 1400-32 (1947).
86. U. S. Treas. Reg. 116, § 405.601 (1944) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 91, § 401.402 (1936),
as amended 26 CoDE Fm. R-Gs. § 401.402 (1939). The employer who must use a deposi-
tary (note 87 infra and accompanying text) attaches receipts issued by the depositary in
payment of withheld funds. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 405.605 (1944).
87. U. S. Treas. Reg. 116, § 405.605 (1944).
19481
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
much criticized 88 Section 64 a(4) of the present Act, tax arrearages
frequently reach so high a total that they far exceed the value of the
estate, and leave nothing for general creditors. The likelihood of this
result is partially responsible for the indifference frequently shown by
general creditors toward bankruptcy administration-an indifference
inimical to a bankruptcy administration bottomed upon creditor con-
trol. Where taxes far exceed assets, it is small wonder that creditors
will not advance money for the investigation of concealment and fraud,
even in such a fantastic case as the one in which a bankrupt with debts
totalling a quarter of a million dollars reported assets of two hundred
dollars, and claimed these as exempt.89 The Conference hopes that the
effect of the limitation on tax priority will be that tax officials will at-
tempt to collect their claims promptly, will thus reveal the debtor's
tax delinquency before it becomes too serious, and so enable other
creditors to take protective steps. Money and goods supplied by credi-
tors who, unaware of the debtor's tax arrearages, continue to extend
credit, are oftentimes used by the bankruptcy trustee to pay pre-bank-
"ruptcy tax claims." While all priorities may reap a similar benefit from
a kindred use of a creditor's money and goods, priorities other than
taxes are more easily discoverable, can be anticipated, and are not so
disproportionate to the value of the estate to be distributed.
Elimination of priority for taxes accrued before a certain date would
improve bankruptcy administration and would effect a more prompt
disclosure of the financial skidding that ends with bankruptcy. A cor-
responding limitation on the present immunity from discharge is prob-
ably advisable, since limiting priority alone would often leave the
discharged debtor with a heavier tax load than he now bears, But the
proponents of a bill which effects such a drastic change have the burden
of showing their measure to be not only desirable from the bankruptcy
standpoint but administratively feasible tax-wise as well. An act to
accomplish this alteration in existing law should be preceded by a care-
ful study of auditing, assessment and other problems of both federal
and state taxing authorities in dealing with a variety of taxes. An es-
timate, based upon available statistics, should be made of the amount
of federal and state income which would be lost by the change. Finally,
attention should be given to safeguarding government from the use of
bankruptcy for tax avoidance. Among the desiderata such a study
88. Olive, Taxes in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 25 TAXES 5 (1947); Montgomery,
Recent Developments and Proposed Reforms in Respect to Tax Claims in. Bankruptcy,
19 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 31 (1944) ; Musgrave, The Tax Priority Bugaboo A6 Corn,.
REoRG. 43 (1945) ; Furst, Tax Problems in Bankruptcy and Reorganication, 66 N..L.J.
173 (1943). reprinted with introductory comment sub noin. Tax Situation in Bankrtptcy,
18 J.N.A. REF. BANKR. 17 (1943).
89. Referee Al. W. O'Rieley Retires, 18 N.J.A. REF. BANKR. 63 (1944).
90. Furst, op. cit. supra note 88 at 173, 18 N.J.A. REF. BANKR. at 1&
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would reveal would probably be that of providing different time limita-
tions for different kinds of taxes. If the tax is relatively simple to com-
pute, as it is where the bankrupt is liable as a tax collector, the one year
period may give tax officials adequate time for assessment and collec-
tion. For more complex taxes, such as the federal income tax, the period
should be longer, and probably suspended during the time the taxpayer
is making use of administrative or judicial machinery to dispute the
assessment. The Conference has not successfully carried this burden of
showing the feasibility of its bill from the standpoint of tax collection
and a revision of the tax provisions of the Bankruptcy Act should ac-
cordingly be postponed.
THE BORAH AcT REPEAL BiL, H.R. 5828
The Borah Act of 1937: 1 (a) prohibits agreements between parties
in interest or their attorneys fixing the amount of fees or other com-
pensation to be paid such persons in federal receivership, reorganization
or bankruptcy proceedings when such costs are to be paid from the
assets of the estate; (b) prohibits the judge from approving such fixed
allowances; (c) makes it unlawful for the judge to appoint as receiver
or trustee any person related to him by consanguinity or affinity, within
the fourth degree; and (d) makes a violation of any of these provisions
a crime. The Conference by H.R. 5828 proposes to emasculate that
Act by striking out provisions (a) and (b), retaining (c),02 and so sharply
limiting the criminal provisions of (d).
Senator Borah, when introducing his bill, epitomized the need for the
measure as follows:
"We have found out through investigation that the heart of the
misdoings with reference to receivership cases was that attor-
neys get together and agree upon large fees, agree upon a re-
ceiver, agree upon receivers' fees, agree upon the compensation
of all parties concerned, and the result is that they simply di-
vide up the carcass and there is nothing left for creditors or
anybody else." 93
Congress had attempted to cure these "cryingevils" 04 in 1934, by in-
cluding in Section 77B, 95 the new corporate reorganization statute, a
provision requiring the court to regulate the amounts of compensation
91. 50 STAT. 810 (1937), 28 U.S.C. §§ 531, 572a (1940).
92. The Conference bill also amends subdivision (c) to make it applicable to referees,
as well as to judges.
93. 81 CONG. Rsc. 8393 (1937).
94. See Realty Associates Securities Corp. v. O'Connor, 295 U.S. 295, 299 (1935) ; 83
CoNG. RE:c. 8681 (1938); 81 CONG. Rm 9517 (1937).
95. 48 STAT. 912, as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Supp. 1935).
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paid out of the estate in 77B proceedings.96 Prior to that time interested
parties, by employing a deposit agreement or by providing in the plan
that the reorganization manager should fix the amounts of compensa-
tion," made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for courts to con-
trol the fees paid from the estate.98 Although the provision in Section
77B limited the effectiveness of deposit agreements and fee provisions
in plans by making it the duty of the judge to disregard them if he found
that the compensation provided for was excessive, fee fixing agreements
were generally still successful. Because "petitions for allowances were
presented at the last stage of the proceeding when conflicting factions
had united in support of the successful plan," 11 and because there was
little or no opposition to assist the court in valuing the services per-
formed, 10 judges tended to acquiesce in the recommendations of the
parties. In 1937, Congress attacked this evil of exorbitant allowances
by striking at its root, the fee fixing agreement.
The need for the measure was thought by its sponsors to be apparent
in 1937 and its retention has since been recommended by the Judicial
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges and the SEC. 10 1 If substantial
repeal of the Borah Act is justified now it must be either because the
reform was unnecessary in 1937 or because conditions have changed
since that time to such an extent that the restriction is no longer neces-
sary. Neither proposition has been established. The Conference now
asserts that the primary purpose of the Borah Act was to prevent a
judge from allowing fees without giving all persons interested in the
estate notice and opportunity to be heard; a purpose now effected by
Section 58a(8), which, applicable to Chapter X, makes adequate pro-
vision for notice and hearing. 2 But the stated purpose of the Borah
Act is to reach the private agreements betveen the parties which were
regarded as "the heart of the misdoings." While Congressman Chandler
mentioned the evasion of hearings as one facet of the problem,"0 ' his
96. Former §§ 77B (c) (9).
97. Medill, Fees and Expenses in a Corporate Reorganization under Section 77B, 34
MIcH. L. R-v. 331, 340-1 (1936).
98. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 282 U.S. 311 (1931); Note, 49
HAIv. L. REv. 1111, 1199 (1936).
99. SEC, Memorandum: Proposed Legislation for the Repeal of the Borah A6 6
(unpublished 1944), submitted to the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges in
1944.
100. SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF TIE WORK, AcrTI S,
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTION OF PaOTECrVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTES 244-5
(1940).
101. REPORT OF JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES 10 (1944). The
SEC filed a memorandum with the Judicial Conference. See note 99 supra.
102. N.B.C., Committee Print 65. See also Williston, Black, and Kurtz, Fees in Re-
organization Proceedings, 18 J.N.A. REF. BANKR. 36, 38 (1944).
103. H.R. REP. No. 1524, 75 Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937).
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report to the House,' as well as Senator Borah's description of the
bill, 05 show a much broader purpose than that now suggested by the
Conference. When the Congressional purpose was merely to require
notice and hearing, precisely that was achieved in the Chandler Act.
Moreover, Senator O'Mahoney, who sponsored the Chandler bill in
the Senate, made it clear that the Borah Act still had a function.1c' A
short answer to the argument of the Conference is that if Congress
meant only to require notice and hearing it chose a strange way of
stating its meaning. The Conference does not state in the comment
to its bill that reform was unnecessary in 1937. But that proposition
is implicit in its second argument. The so-called agreement, says the
Conference, would be merely a recommendation to the court, binding
on no one, and an aid to the court in fixing fees, as are the recommenda-
tions of the SEC. 07 This argument overlooks the pre-Borah Act his-
tory that demonstrates the coercive effect of such agreements upon the
courts. Nothing in the Borah Act prohibits individual recommenda-
tions as to the amounts of compensation properly allowable. In fact
it promotes individual, instead of agreed-upon advice to the qout. The
plea for freedom of recommendation misses the mark.
The Borah Act continues to perform a useful function in forbidding
fee-fixing agreements that make it difficult for the court to scale down
excessive demands. 'While public opinion no longer spotlights the prob-
lem of excessive reorganization expenses, it is partly because the Borah
Act has done much to mitigate the evil. The need for the law is as great
now as when enacted.
ADDITIONAL AmENDMENTS NEEDED TO SUPPLEMENT CoNFipxERNcr.'s
NoN-CONTROVESIAL BILL
The Conference aptly characterizes its proposed bill, H.R. 5693, as
non-controversial in character. But it is too limited. Summarizing its
coverage in an Appendix,' we now deal with matters not within its
scope-many of them non-controversial and all proper to be dealt with
by any extensive revision of the Act.
The definition of insolvency in Section la(19) should be amended to
exclude all of the debtor's exempt property in determining the aggre-
gate value of his assets. No sound reason can be advanced for including
exempt property, which creditors cannot reach either in or out of bank-
ruptcy, in determining the insolvency of a person for bankruptcy pur-
poses. 09 The definition would then accord with insolvency as defined
104. H-R. REP. No. 1524, 75 Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
105. 81 CONG. REc. 8393 (1937).
106. 83 CoNG. Ec 8681 (1938).
107. N.B.C.J. Committee Print 65-6.
108. P. 717 infra.
109. See 1 Couim 71-2.
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in Section 67d(1) (d), the Bankruptcy Act's spearhead against fraudu-
lent transfers.
Section 2, which deals with courts of bankruptcy and their jurisdic-
tion, should be amended in two respects. Introductory paragraph (a)
should be expanded to give the bankruptcy court jurisdiction in ad-
miralty in addition to the jurisdiction at law and in equity which it now
has. Failure to give the bankruptcy court admiralty jurisdiction is an
anomaly that results in confusion or is disregarded by the federal judge
who has power to sit as an admiralty court regardless of the mysteries
that surround him when sitting as a court of bankruptcy.110 Clause (1)
dealing with venue should provide that improper venue is not ground
for dismissal and, in addition, that any proceeding may be transferred
to a more convenient forum.1 ' This latter suggestion would be in line
with Section 118 of Chapter X; both suggestions follow the treatment
accorded venue in civil actions by the proposed Judicial Code Revi-
sion. 1
12
While apts of bankruptcy have been criticized as anachronistic,"'
they have been imbedded in our bankruptcy jurisdiction so long that
their displacement by some other standard, such as financial status,
would be a novel cure worse than the evil. If instead the acts of bank-
ruptcy are meshed more carefully with the avoiding sections of the
Act 114 they will serve a useful purpose in setting rather objective stand-
ards as to when a debtor is fit for involuntary bankruptcy. To accom-
plish this end the first three acts of bankruptcy should be revised. The
first act, insofar as it deals with a fraudulent transfer, should not be
restricted, as it now is, to an "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his
creditors or any of them." It should denounce as fraudulent any trans-
fer coming within the purview of Sections 67d and 70e, the avoiding sec-
tions of the Act dealing with fraudulent transfers. And the intent of
the debtor to prefer should be eliminated from the second act. Such an
intent, is not an element of a preferential transfer as defined in Section
110. See 1 CoumER 12.10.
111. Section 32 does not fill this need. It provides for the transfer of cases pending in
different courts of bankruptcy which involve the same person or different members of a
partnership, where each court has jurisdiction, to another court having jurisdiction. There
is no power to transfer cases to a more convenient forum which does not have venue, as
there is in Chapter X cases by virtue of § 118.
112. H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1404, 1406 (1947). Section 1404(a) permits
transfer of a civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought, "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." Sec-
tion 1406(a) requires the district court to transfer a case where venue is laid improperly to
"any district or division in which it could have been brought."
113. See Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy
Law, 52 Hagv. L. R-v. 189 (1938).
114. See 3 Co~unm 749-50 and nn.69 and 70 for a discussion of the failure of the
acts of bankruptcy to mesh with the avoiding sections.
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60a. While the courts have used an objective standard in defining
"intent to prefer," 115 this element in the second act of bankruptcy
remains needlessly troublesome, and from the point of view of an equi-
table distribution among creditors the debtor's intent is wholly irrele-
vant. If these changes were made, a conforming change would be
needed in the last sentence of Section 3b insofar as it deals with intent
as related to the first and second acts of bankruptcy. Some change is
also needed in the second sentence of Section 3b which provides that
the four-month period, within which an involuntary petition may be
filed with respect to the first and second acts of bankruptcy, "shall not
expire until four months after the date when the transfer . . . became
so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the debtor and no
creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so
transferred . . . superior to the rights of the transferee." Language
paralleling this creditor and bona fide purchaser test is found in Section
60a, which deals with preferences, and in Section 67d(5) which deals
with fraudulent transfers. As to the latter section, the Conference's
non-controversial bill proposes to eliminate the creditor test since a
fraudulent transfer is never perfected as against a creditor until the
applicable statute of limitations has barred creditor relief-which may
be many years-although the transfer is a matter of public record and
good as against a bona fide purchaser.', Certainly a conforming change
needs to be made in Section 3b. And if the test of perfection relative to
preferences is changed in Section 60a a like conforming change must,
of course, be made in Section 3b. Under Section 67a a judicial lien ob-
tained within four months of bankruptcy while the debtor is insolvent
is voidable by the trustee. The third act of bankruptcy deals with
judicial liens but is so drafted that the act of bankruptcy may not be
committed until thirty days after the judicial lien has attached. If a
bankruptcy petition is filed more than three months thereafter, al-
though within four months, as literally it may be under Section 3b,
the debtor may be adjudged a bankrupt because of his failure to vacate
the judicial lien although it is evident that the trustee cannot invalidate
the lien. This incongruity has led many courts to hold that the bank-
ruptcy petition alleging the third act of bankruptcy is not timely unless
the lien is within the avoiding time limit of Section 67a.n 7 This matter
should be clarified in line with these holdings. 18 While revising Section
115. E.g., Shingleton v. Armour Boulevard Corp., 107 F.2d 440 (C.C.A.Sth 1939); In
re Richenell Fabric MAfg. Co., 31 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
116. Lind v. 0. N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 282 N.WV. 661 (1938) (statute of
limitations does not begin to run until time of creditor's judgment against debtor). But
cf. Buttles v. Smith, 231 N.Y. 226, 22 N.E. 2d 350 (1939) (statute begins to run at time
of fraudulent conveyance).
117. E.g., Storrie v. McAlester Fuel Co., 133 F.2d 1003 (C.C.A.10th 1943) ; 1 COLLum
13.313 and cases cited n.10.
118. The third act should not be available unless the lien can be avoided under § 67a,
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3 and in the interests of certainty the fifth act of bankruptcy should be
clarified in line with the great weight of authority that the receivership
there dealt with is a general equity receivership." 9
The 1938 revision of Section 5 on partnerships quite generally
adopted the entity theory of partnership, the result being a more
workable section. 12 But the question as to when a partnership is in-
solvent is still an unsettled one, important in two situations: (1) where
a voluntary partnership petition is filed by fewer than all of the general
partners; 121 and (2) where an involuntary petition is filed against the
partnership alleging an act of bankruptcy of which insolvency is an
element. 2 2 If the aggregate theory of partnership is followed the
partnership is not insolvent, despite the excess of partnership liabilities
over partnership assets, so long as there is one solvent general partner.
If the entity theory is followed the partnership is insolvent when its
liabilities exceed its assets. While the weight of authority and the more
recent decisions adhere to the aggregate theory, 123 we feel that the
entity theory should be followed. This does not mean that the sub-
stantive liability of the general partners is affected in the slightest;
their personal liability will remain unaffected. It merely means that
the partnership is a fit subject for bankruptcy when the assets devoted
to its business are less than its debts unless the partners are willing to
cure the deficiency by additional contributions of capital.
Both original and appellate jurisdiction need attention. While Sec-
tion 23, which deals with plenary jurisdiction, might well be clarified,2 4
although corresponding provisions should not be made in the first and second acts. It is
fairly simple to determine whether a lien will be voidable under § 67a, but attempting
to show that a fraudulent transfer or a preference could be avoided as against an alleged
fraudulent transferee or preferee would inject controversial issues into the determination
of weather an act of bankruptcy has been committed.
119. See, e.g., Elfast v. Lamb, 111 F.2d 434, 436 (C.C.A. 2d 1940) (suffering appoint-
ment of receiver under New York Martin Act to administer property fraudulently ob-
tained for purpose of returning it to persons defrauded does not constitute fifth act of
bankruptcy): "That to constitute an act of bankruptcy the receiver must be a general
one has been the rule laid down in numerous decisions."
"A receivership in foreclosure does not constitute an act of bankruptcy." 1 COLLIm
13.502.
120. 1 COLLIER 5.03; cf. Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 908 (1939).
121. Sections 5b and 18b.
122. The act complained of must be a partnership act, an application of the entity
theory. Mills v. J. H. Fisher & Co., 159 Fed. 897 (C.C.A.6th 1908).
123. Mason v. Mitchell, 135 F.2d 599 (C.C.A.9th 1943); Tom v. Sampsell, 131 F.2d
779 (C.C.A.9th 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 786 (1943) ; sec Francis v. McNeal, 228
U.S. 695, 700 (1913) ; 1 COLLIER 5.06 n.3.
124. Section 23 was originally drafted to deal with district courts and circuit courts,
subsections a and c dealing exclusively with the latter. Although circuit courts were
abolished in 1911, the section retained its original peculiar cast, which tends to be con-
[Vol. 57: 683
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS
a much more important problem is how to deal adequately with sum-
mary jurisdiction and integrate it with plenary jurisdiction. The bank-
ruptcy court has summary jurisdiction: (1) where given it by the Act;
(2) where the controversy involves property which is in the actual or
constructive possession of the bankruptcy court; and (3) where the
defendant consents. 125 On a consent rationale, summary jurisdiction
was early sustained where, in a proceeding brought by the trustee, the
defendant, although in possession of property under a substantial ad-
verse claim, did not object to the jurisdiction either by a pre-pleading
motion or in the answer. He was held to have consented to jurisdiction
by first proceeding on the merits. -120 This salutary principle was largely
destroyed by Cline v. Kaplan,127 which seems to hold that, where sum-
mary jurisdiction must rest upon consent of the defendant, he may
litigate on the merits, and his formal objection to jurisdiction is timely
if made before entry of the final order by the bankruptcy court. This
rule should be repudiated by statute and the earlier judicial rule
adopted. In addition, provision should be made for transfer of the
summary proceeding to the civil docket and disposition of the case
there whenever (1) the defendant's objection to summary jurisdiction
is or should have been sustained, and (2) there would be federal juris-
diction, as provided in Section 23, were the proceeding an original
plenary action.
One other related matter needs attention. Under Section 57g the
trustee may object to the allowance of a claim on the ground that the
creditor has received a voidable preference or a fraudulent lien or trans-
fer. Since there is summary jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court to
allow or disallow the creditor's claim, it is held that the court has sum-
mary jurisdiction to determine whether the creditor is the recipient of
a voidable preference or fraudulent transfer or lien, but that the court
does not acquire jurisdiction to enter an affirmative judgment in favor
of the trustee for the recovery of the preference or the property fraudu-
lently conveyed.SI1 This rule, which makes two law suits grow where
fusing. However, the meaning of the section has been largely settled by decision. Schu-
macher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934). Still in need of clarification is the question of
jurisdiction over causes of action arising after the petition is filed, as where the bank-
ruptcy receiver or trustee sues or is sued on a contract made by him or for some act
committed by him. 2 COLLIER 123.16.
125. 2 COLLImR ff 23.05-.08.
126. Moonblatt v. Kosmin, 139 F.2d 412 (1943). General Order 37 makes the
Federal Rules generally applicable in bankruptcy proceedings. Oglebay, Sot= Dc'clop-
eients in Bankruptcy Law, 18 J.N.A. REF. BAxNm. 9, 13 (1943). "It must be remembered
that the 'jurisdiction' we are now discussing can be conferred by consent; it does not
go to jurisdiction of the subject-matter over ordinary civil actions, formerly at law or in
equity, which cannot be conferred." 2 CoLLIE 123.03 n.63 (Supp. 1946).
127. 323 U.S. 97 (1944). The case is criticized in Oglebay, op. cit. supra note 126 at 75.
128. 2 Coum.aR 514-7. This is the usual holding, although a few cases seem to say that
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one would amply suffice, should be repudiated in either of two ways:
give summary jurisdiction to enter an affirmative judgment; or allow
the creditor to have.the matter transformed into a plenary suit and
transferred to the civil docket.
The 1938 revision of Sections 24 and 25 greatly simplified appellate
jurisdiction and procedure. 2 1 Section 24, however, still requires a diffi-
cult distinction to be drawn at times between a proceeding in bank-
ruptcy and a controversy arising in a proceeding in bankruptcy, since
as to the former both interlocutory and final orders are appealable,
while as to the latter the order must be final.' The distinction is some-
times overlooked, 131 is always difficult to make when pertinent, and
serves no useful purpose. Appellate jurisdiction would not be appre-
ciably enlarged if an interlocutory order in a controversy arising in a
proceeding in bankruptcy were made appealable.
-Under Section 25 the time for taking an appeal in non-plenary litiga-
tion varies from a minimum of thirty days to a maximum of forty days
depending upon the service of a notice of the entry of the order. Prior
to the recent amendments of the Federal Rules the general time for an
appeal in a civil action, which included a plenary action brought by
the receiver or trustee pursuant to Section 23,132 was three months
from the entry of the judgment. 1 3 Under the amendments, which have
now become effective, the time for appeal is in general reduced to sixty
days in government cases and thirty days in other cases.' 4 Normally
then the time for appeal under the Federal Rules is thirty days and in
the interest 'of uniformity the time prescribed in Section 25 should be
conformed to the Federal Rule.
The requirements of Section 59b relative to the type of claims which
the petitioning creditors must have are too onerous. First there is a
the court does acquire such jurisdiction. Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d 784 (C.C.AAth
1938) ; Flora Realty & Investment Co. v. Steem Electric Corp., 128 F.2d 338 (C.C.A.Sth
1942) ; In re Gillespie Tire Co., 54 F. Supp. 336 (W.D.S. Car. 1942). Even though it is
held that filing a claim does not confer jurisdiction, the referee's order is res adjudicata as
to the fact that a preference was given. 3 COLLIER 193-4 n.38, 1030-2. But that order does
not establish the amount of the preference. Feiring v. Gano, 114 Colo. 567, 168 P.2d 901
(1946).
129. WEINSTIN, THE BANxRTJPTcY LAW OF 1938, 64-8 (1938).
130. Goldie v. Carr, 116 F.2d 335 (C.C.A.9th 1940).
131. Long Beach v. Metcalf, 103 F.2d 483 (C.C.A.9th 1939). The court was in posses-
sion of property in a summary proceeding by the trustee which was essentially a quiet title
action, clearly a controversy in a proceeding in bankruptcy. An appeal was allowed from
an order overruling defendant's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
132. 2 CoxLmER 1 24.10,25.02.
133. 26 STAT, 829 (1891), 43 STAT. 940 (1925), 28 U.S.C. § 230 (1940).
134. FED. R. Civ. P., 73(a). The district court may extend the time for appeal not
exceeding 30 days "upon a showing of excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to
learn of the entry of the judgment of the district court." Government cases are those "in
which the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party."
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requirement that the claims be "fixed as to liability," which taken in
conjunction with the somewhat parallel language in Section 63a(1)
creates an inference that the claims must be established by a judgment
or an instrument in writing. This misleading inference can be cured by
providing that the provable claims "be matured and not contingent." 135
The motivation behind the further requirement that the claims be
"liquidated as to amount" was to avoid the necessity of determining a
contest collateral to the principal issue. 13 But the language goes far
beyond the proper objective. Thus A may not be qualified to be a peti-
tioning creditor where his unsecured claim is unliquidated although
there is no doubt that far more than $500 is due him, 1 7 or where he has
a large claim that is partially secured and the value of the security can-
not be stated with certainty, although it is clear that its value could
not possibly reduce A's unsecured claim to $500. 11 This should be
remedied. And where the creditors are less than twelve in number
Section 59b literally allows only one creditor to be a petitioner, although
there is no sound reason why more than one should not be allowed to
join as petitioners. In computing the number of the debtor's creditors
for the purpose of determining how many creditors must join as peti-
tioners, Section 59e should be coordinated with Section 56c by exclud-
ing from the computation those creditors holding claims of $50 or less.'
Without departing from the general policy underlying Section 64a(2)
which limits the priorities for wages to those earned within three months
of bankruptcy, an exception should be made to protect wage earners in
cases where bankruptcy supersedes some prior insolvency proceeding.
For example, if the debtor-employer files a bankruptcy petition his
employees are protected by the second priority. If on the other hand,
he makes a general assignment and almost four months later his credi-
tors precipitate him into bankruptcy, the wage earners lose all or part
135. Before 1938 contingent claims were unprovable under § 63a and could not be the
basis of an involuntary petition under § 59b. The Chandler Act made contingent claims
provable under § 63a(8). The words "fixed as to liability" were added in § 59h to continue
the old rule under that section. This language is criticized in Morgan, Section 59b of the
Chandler Act: An Impediment to Involuntary Banhrupfcy Procecdings, 37 Iu. L. Rnv
215, 217-8 (1942).
136. Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1936). See 3 CouIaM 159.14
(Supp. 1946).
137. Cf. Morgan, op. cit. supra note 135, at 217.
138. See In re Central Illinois Oil & Refining Co., 133 F.2d 657, 660 (C.C.A. 7th 1943).
139. 3 COLLIER l 59.20. See Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Tarlton, 294 Fed. 698 (W.D.
Tenn. 1923), for an example of the plight of one large creditor where there are more than
eleven other creditors with inconsequential claims. In that case the court refused to count
the creditors with trifling claims. Other courts have counted such creditors because § 59e
does not specifically exclude them. E.g., Grigsby-Grunow Co. Y. Hieb Radio Supply Co.,
71 F.2d 113 (C.CA.8th 1934).
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of their priority for wages, due solely to the shift from one liquidating
forum to another.
14
Section 67d(3) needs restatement. This paragraph denounces as
fraudulent any transfer made with intent to use the consideration to
effect a voidable preference. The provision was written into the Act
in 1938 as a purported restatement of the rule of Dean v. Davis,"' which
presented an extreme situation. The debtor, fearing arrest because of
forged notes which had been given to a bank persuaded his brother-in-
law to take up the notes in return for the debtor's promise to mortgage
all his property to secure the advance. The debtor was known by his
brother-in-law to be hopelessly insolvent; due to acceleration clauses
in the debtor's notes to his relative the latter had the right to proceed
to enforce his mortgage immediately and did so. The Supreme Court
stressed the fact that this was not a good faith commercial transaction
to enable the debtor to continue his business, but a device to enable the
debtor to make a preferential payment with bankruptcy in contempla-
tion. Section 67d(3) literally embraces not only the Dean v. Davis situa-
tion but any situation where the debtor is insolvent, borrows money,
and gives security, with the intent to use the money to pay off some of
his unsecured creditors. This latter situation should not be denounced
as fraudulent inasmuch as the debtor is making a bona fide attempt to
carry on his business; insofar as he makes preferential payments Section
60 gives his creditors adequate protection. In one respect Section
67d(3) imposes an unsound limitation on the Dean v. Davis doctrine.
The section requires the preferential payment to be voidable which
means that the preferee must have had reasonable cause to believe that
the debtor was then insolvent. If the debtor mortgages his property in
contemplation of bankruptcy with intent to use the proceeds to make
preferential payments it should be wholly immaterial whether the pref-
erences are voidable; if anything, the estate needs greater protection
in the case where the preference is not voidable.
Section 67d(6) should be revised to afford the trustee the right to
preserve a fraudulent lien for the benefit of the estate. Prior to the
Chandler Act of 1938, former Section 67b gave the trustee a general
right to preserve voidable liens. 142 The Act of 1938 eliminated that
140. , E.g., Strom v. Peikes, 123 F.2d 1003 (C.C.A.2d 1941); In re Ko-cd Tavern, 129
F.2d 806 (C.C.A.3d 1942). Also desirable would be a corresponding amendment to the
general priority statute, REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1940), which gives
absolute priority to debts due the United States where the debtor is insolvent or the
estate of the deceased debtor is insolvent. Wage claims given priority by state law should
be-allowed ahead of debts due the United States. The hardship produced by the present
statute is illustrated by United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941).
141. 242 U.S. 438 (1917) ; 4 COLLIEa 1 67.38.
142. 4 CoL.nm 167.41. Former § 67f, which provided for the avoidance of liens ob-
tained through judicial proceedings while the debtor was insolvent within the four-month
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provision and gave the trustee a right to preserve both voidable prefer-
ential 141 and judicial liens; 144 it inadvertently failed, however, to give
the trustee the same right to preserve liens voidable under Sections
67d and 70e. 145 The Conference proposes to cure this omission by an
amendment of Section 70e, but fails to make a similar proposal as to
Section 67d. A similar amendment of Section 67d(6) is in order.
A more summary and less elaborate corporate reorganization proced-
ure should be afforded for small corporations. Superficially Chapter
XI offers such a procedure," 6 but since under Chapter XI neither se-
cured debt nor stockholders' interests can be affected 117 the chapter is
largely abortive as to corporations. The small corporation which needs
relief from secured debt and is such a going concern that it deserves
rehabilitation rather than liquidation must come within the elaborate
provisions of Chapter X.141 And many corporations, large or small,
which need relief only from unsecured debt, find Chapter XI a delusion.
Under its provisions, the court is barred from dealing with stockholders'
interests, and therefore the arrangement must be at the expense of
creditors, to the advantage of stockholders, and hence cannot meet the
absolute priority standard demanded by the requirement that the ar-
rangement be fair and equitable.1"9 Only where the stock is closely
held and all the holders either can be said to contribute value in the
form of experience or managerial talent to the concern or will volun-
tarily make other contributions can the arrangement meet the strict
absolute priority test.'-" A small improvement can be made by incor-
period, also gave the trustee power to preserve the lien he had avoided for the benefit of the
estate. The Chandler Act retained this provision, moving it to § 67a(3). Under the amend-
ment of § 60b by the Act of 1938 the trustee is given comparable power to preserve avoid-
able preferential lien or title.
143. Section 60b. See note 142 supra; 3 CorTzia 1160.65.
144. Section 67a(3). See note 142 supra; 4 CoLmRff 67.16.
145. As to the omission in § 70e, see4 CoLLmtR 70.92.
146. Under Chapter XI the debtor may be permitted to retain control of its property,
§ 342, must formulate a plan before the petition is filed, and submit it with the petition,
§ 323, and may solicit acceptances at any time. See Montgomery, Chapter XI of [lie Ban.-
ruptcy Act, 15 J. N. A. REF. BANM. 16 (1940).
147. Sections 306 (1), 356, 357.
148. Among other things, a Chapter X petition must state "the specific facts showing
the need for relief under this chapter and why adequate relief cannot be obtained under
chapter XI of this Act" § 130(7). Sections 141 and 143 of chapter X require the judge
to dismiss the petition if he is not satisfied that it was filed in good faith. Section 146 of
Chapter X provides that a petition shall not be deemed to have been filed in good faith if,
inter alia, adequate relief would be obtainable under Chapter XI or if "it is unreasonable
to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected." See also note 152 in Ira as to som
of the safeguards provided by Chapter X. For a brief discussion of the relationship be-
tween Chapters X and XI, see 6 CoL=zza 0.12.
149. Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. United States Realty & Improvement Co.,
310 U.S. 434 (1940), see note 8 supra and accompanying text.
150. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 303 U.S. 106 (1939) ; see note 10 supra
and accompanying te.'.
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porating a provision in Chapter XI, comparable to Section 147 in Chap-
ter X, to allow a corporate petition, improperly filed under Chapter
XI because adequate relief can only be obtained in Chapter X, to be
transferred to that chapter. But what is especially needed is to provide,
within the framework of Chapter X, a summary method of reorganiza-
tion for the small corporation that is comparable in speed and facility
to the arrangement procedure of Chapter XI. A corporation whose
scheduled indebtedness does not exceed, for example, $3,000,000 1
might well be treated as a small corporation, and allowed to remain in
possession of its property, propose a plan and solicit acceptances im-
mediately upon the initiation of the reorganization proceeding. Refer-
ence of the plan to the Securities and Exchange Commission for report
could still be retained as a safeguard, but after the requisite acceptances
of the plan are obtained a speedy confirmation hearing should be pos-
sible. Such a summary reorganization procedure should, of course, be
made subject to the court's power to transform it into a regular reorgan-
ization, appoint an independent trustee, and have the plan formulated
under all the present elaborate safeguards found in Chapter X.112 This
chapter was written primarily with the large corporation in mind and
its carefully designed provisions should not be relaxed as to such a
corporation. They should also be held in reserve for the small corpora-
tion where there is evidence of managerial fraud, or where there is likeli-
hood of overreaching on the part of any class of creditors or stockholders
due to the financial complexities of the corporation. The time and expense
demanded by the present reorganization procedure of Chapter X are
justified in the case of the large corporation and for the small corpora-
tion just described. But a speedier and cheaper reorganization proced-
ure should be available for the small and honestly managed corporation
with a simple capital structure.
CONCLUSION
The Chandler Act of 1938 has proved to be an excellent piece of legis-
lation, carefully conceived and well drafted. While no one doubts that
this legislation can be improved, and that after ten years an undertak-
151. $3,000,000 is the figure which determines whether the SEC shall pass on the plan
under Chapter X. If the scheduled indebtedness exceeds that sum, the SEC must examine
the plan and report on it. The judge may submit the plan to that agency even if the sched-
uled indebtedness is less than that amdunt. Section 172. This figure was apparently
selected with a view to delineating the small cases in which "the situation is so simple that
it is wholly maneagable by the court." Hearing before Committee on Judiciary on HR?.
6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1937). The figure was reduced from an original $5,000,:
000, H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1937).
152. These include the appointment of a disinterested trustee, § 156, an investigation of
the affairs of the debtor, § 167, the formulation of a plan by the trustee, § 169, cf. § 168,
examination of the plan by the SEC, §§ 172-3, and judicial regulation of creditors' con-
mittees, § 176.
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ing of the task is in order, nevertheless the same unhurried and disin-
terested care should go into the amending process that went into the
original formulation. Proponents of substantial change must assume
the burden of demonstrating the desirability of their proposals. The
bills to amend Section 60 are the product of unwarranted alarm, aid
secret financing, and are an uncertain retreat to pre-Chandler days.
The bona fide purchaser test as expounded by the Supreme Court in
the Klauder case and by the Third Circuit in the Rosen case is sound
and should be retained. The proposal to add as Section 70i a federal
filing act for the assignment of accounts receivable is salutary in hitting
at secret financing. The provisions of the tax bill are impracticable,
but when put in feasible form they may be properly interwoven into
an extensive revision. The Borah Act should be retained. The Con-
ference's non-controversial amendments and those which we propose
by way of supplementation can properly await the final completion
of the overall revision. Piecemeal revision of the Bankruptcy Act is
not desirable and an adequate overhauling of the Act is not feasible at
this session of Congress.
APPENDIX
So-called non-controversial amendments proposed by H.R. 5693
(Where feasible, new matter is shown in italics.)
Section amended Proposed change
Definitions
la (24) "Petition" redefined to mean a document, filed with court or clerl,
"initiating a proceeding" under the Act, and thus clearly includes
an "original" petition under the reorganization and arrangement
chapters.
(30) "Transfer" expanded to include "the retention of a security title to
properly delivered to a debtor." Purpose is to make preference
section unequivocally applicable to conditional sales and similar
security devices. This is not a change in the law as presently in-
terpreted. 3 CoLTERn 1 60.43; ef. 1 60.44.
Creation of Courts of Bankruptcy and Their Jurisdiction
2a (21) Turnover and accounting by non-bankruptcy receiver or trustee
appointed more than four months prior to petition also to be re-
quired in proceedings under § 77; § 2a (21) now refers only to
Chapters X and XII. Original omission of reference to § 77 was
inadvertent.
Duties of Bankrupts
7a (8) Permits bankrupt to show either place of bianess or residence of
creditor in his list of creditors.
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Suits against Bankrupt
11a Proviso requiring vacating stay of suit against bankrupt it he has
been adjudicated bankrupt, has been discharged or has had com-
position confirmed within six years, amended to require vacating
stay only if bankrupt has been discharged or had composition con-
firmed in proceeding commenced within six years. Thus com-
mencement of prior bankruptcy proceeding is determinative date,
and adjudication as bankrupt is immaterial.
Granting of Discharge
14c (5) Commencement of prior proceeding resulting in discharge or con-
firmation of plan or composition within six years bars discharge,
Thus commencement of prior proceeding, when rights of former
creditors became fixed, is determinative date instead of actual dis-
charge or confirmation.
14e Bankrupt's failure to appear at "hearing upon the objections to
his application for a discharge," instead of "hearing upon his ap-
plication for a discharge," bars discharge. Clarifying.
Process
18a Insofar as service is not specifically regulated by § 18a, it is to be
made in the same manner as in "a civil action," instead of in "a
suit in equity."
Evidence
21k Parties entitled to rights and remedies granted by "Rules of Civil
Procedure . . ." instead of "rules of equity practice."
Offenses-Statute of Limitations
29d In case of concealment of assets, statute of limitations is made to
run from waiver or loss of right to discharge as well as from
granting of discharge. To cure an omission. 2 Collier U 29.14.
Duties of Referees
39a (9) Eliminates requirement that referee report completion of arrange-
ments and wage earner plans to court. Clarifying changes also.
Records of Referees
42a Requires records to be kept as prescribed by Supreme Court in-
stead of as "kept in equity cases." The better approach would
have been to give the power of prescription to the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, subject to the
approval of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, in
line with Federal Rule 79 (a).
Proof and Allowance of Claims
57j (1) (Newly numbered.) Interest on debt due state or federal gov-
ernment for amount of pecuniary loss sustained by government
in transaction out of which penalty or forfeiture arose not al-
lowed after bankruptcy. ,
(2) (New paragraph.) Interest on taxes not allowed after bank-
ruptcy; except where estate is solvent. This exception might
properly be made applicable also to paragraph (1), although it is
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not too important since the debts embraced therein are not dis-
chargeable under § 17. 1 ComLm 17.05, 17.13. The proposed
change in the law as to interest on taxes is clarif ing and in line
with a sound, but not judicially accepted, construction of the pres-
ent AcL 3 CoLLmR ff 63.16.
57n ".. . except in proceedings under Chapters X, XI, XII, and
XIII of this Act" infants and insane persons without guardians,
and without notice of bankruptcy proceeding, now have six addi-
tional months to file claims. The "except" clause is deleted as use-
less and perhaps confusing due to the general inapplicability of
§ 57n to the proceedings covered by it.
Notices
58a (8) Creditors to be given notice of applications by "conmmitlces" for
compensation for services rendered as well as applications by re-
ceivers, ancillary receivers, marshals, trustees and attorneys.
Debts Which May Be Proved
63c A verbal change is made to conform to the redefinition of "peti-
tion" in § la(24).
Debts Which Have Priority
64a (1) Filing fees advanced to a voluntary bankrupt are made reimburs-
able and accorded a first priority. Expenses incurred by the trus-
tee "it; connection with the crihninal prosecution of an offerse
punishable under this Act or an offcure concering the business or
property of the bankrupt punishable wider other laws, fedcral or
state" are made compensable and given first priority. This meshes
with present § 29e (1) and is clarifying. Where in a proceeding
under another chapter of the Act it is ordered that bankruptcy be
proceeded with, expenses of the ensuing bankruptcy are given
priority over unpaid administration costs and epenses of the
superseded proceeding and suspended bankruptcy proceeding, if
any. This changes the present law, 6 ComER f 12.05[4], and prob-
ably is desirable as promoting an effective final consummation of
the proceeding.
64b Repealed because of its inadequacies. See 3 Comn 164.601 and
Supplement. Thus priority is eliminated of debts contracted be-
tween grant of a discharge and subsequent revocation. Section
64b accorded a priority to debts contracted in the interim ba-
tween the confirmation of an arrangement and its annulment. This
problem is now dealt with by new §§ 239, 379, 484, and 669, infra.
Liens and Fraudulent Transfers
67a (1), (2), b, c Subdivisions a, b, and c deal respectively with the avoidance of
judicial liens, the recognition of statutory liens, and the subordi-
nation and restriction in the amount of payment of statutory liens
in certain very limited situations. Verbal changes are made in
these subdivisions to conform to the redefinition of "petition" by
§ la(24). H.R. 5829 would amend §67c to invalidate unenforced
liens on personal property unaccompanied by possession, except
liens for taxes, wages, and rent. See p. 701 .supra.
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Subdivision d deals with fraudulent transfers and, with the ex-
ception of paragraphs (3) and (5), is a substantial adaptation of
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. 4 CoyLE 11 67.29, 67.38,
67A0. Paragraph (3) is supposedly a restatement of the rule of
Dean v. Davis. See p. 714, supra. Verbal changes are made in
paragraphs (2)-(5) to conform them to the redefinition of "peti-
tion" by § la(24). Paragraph (5) states when a fraudulent trans-
fer is deemed perfected. The words "and no creditor" are deleted
from the bona fide purchaser and creditor perfection test since a
fraudulent transfer is never perfected as against a creditor until
the statute ot limitations has barred creditor relief. Thus a trans-
fer is deemed made when it becomes so far perfected that no bona
fide purchaser from the debtor can obtain rights in the property
superior to the transferee, or, if not so perfected, then immediately
before the initiation of a proceeding under the Act. If this change
is to be made here then a similar change should be made in § 3b
dealing with the running of the four-month period relative to the
first act of bankruptcy-a fraudulent transfer. See p. 709, slupra.
There is still a failure to provide that the trustee may preserve
the transfer or obligation for the benefit of the estate as he may
presently do under §§ 60b, and 67a(3), and as it is proposed to
allow him to do under amended § 70e(2), infra. See pp. 714-15,
.vcpra.
Taking Possession of Property
Conformed to § 2a(21) by including "an assignee for the bencefit of
creditors of a bankrupt, or an agent authoribed to take possession
of or to liquidate any of the property of a bankrupt" as among
those who must account to the bankruptcy court. This is only a
clear statement as to what was the necessary intent of the Act. 4
COLLIER 169.06, n.1.
Title to Property
A verbal change is made relative to the time when the trustee's
title vests to conform the subdivision to the redefinition of "peti-
tion" by § la (24).
Subdivision e allows the trustee to invalidate a transfer or obliga-
tion which, under federal or state law (normally the latter), is
voidable by a creditor having a claim provable in bankruptcy. The
amendment would allow the trustee to preserve the transfer or
obligation for the benefit of the estate and thus cure, in part, an
omission in the present Act. See 4 Cou.IER 354, 1501.
Repealed. Subdivision 'T' relettered to read "h." Present sub-
division h, which is marked for repeal along with present § 64b,
provides that when an arrangement or wage-earner plan is set
aside, or discharge revoked, the trustee, upon appointment and
qualification, is vested with title to the bankrupt's property as of
the date of the final decree setting aside the arrangement or wage-
earner plan or revoking the discharge. Where confirmation of an
arrangement under either Chapter XI, XII or XIII is set aside
and an order entered directing that bankruptcy be proceeded with,
new §§ 379, 484, and 668 vest the trustee with title to the debtor's
property as of that time. New § 239 is not clear as to the bank-
ruptcy trustee's title where a corporate reorganization plan is not
[Vol. 57: 683
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS
finally consummated. Presumably he would take title to property
of the debtor at the time the proceeding was first initiated and also
to property acquired by the reorganization trustee or the debtor
continued in possession, as the case may be, between the time the
proceeding was initiated and the time when the order is entered
directing that bankruptcy be proceeded with. See 6 Collier ff 8.04,
12.05[2], [3]. But this matter could properly be clarified. Where
a discharge is revoked the fair inference from the repeal of §§ 64b
and 70h is that the trustee, if there still be one, does not take title
to property acquired by the debtor subsequent to bankruptcy and
that creditors whose claims arose during the interim between
bankruptcy and revocation do not have provable claims, except to
the very limited extent stated in § 63b, and hence do not share in
the distribution.
Relettering subdivisions and renumbering sections is ill-advised
mechanically; it makes references to sections and subdivisions in
cases and secondary materials obsolete and confusing. Here no
subdivision should be substituted for "l', "i" should be left alone,
and, if an accounts receivable filing act is to be added as proposed
in the Conference preference bill, see pp. 695-6 supra, it should be
lettered "j." This criticism applies to the proposed renumbering
of §§ 379 and 380, and 484 and 485, and 653.
CHAPmR X. CoaPoFATE RaGo AizAnoNs
Confirmation of Plan by Court
221b Newly added subdivision b provides that court shall, after proper
notice, fix a time when the trustee or debtor in possession shall
cease to operate the business, and when the debtor or other corpo-
ration designated in the plan shall commence operation. In the
words of M61r. Gerdes it is highly desirable that there be a definite
time "at which rights vest under the plan sufficiently to make it
equitable: (1) to compel those who extend new credit to the re-
organized debtor or new entity to look'to such reorganized debtor
or new entity for the satisfaction of their claims instead of giving
such creditors the preferred status of holders of debts of adminis-
tration of the estate; and (2) to cut off further right to amend or
modify the plan as to matters materially and adversely affecting
the rights of creditors or stockholders by the ordinary procedure
for the amendment of a plan under section 222." A. B. C. Com-
mittee Print 49-50 (1948). The newly added subdivision b to
§ 221, the amendment to § 222, and new § 239 provide the definite
time and resolve the conflicting approaches created in the Equita-
ble Building reorganization. See Knight v. Wertheim & Co., 158
F.2d 838 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
Alteration or Moderation of Plan
222 Time to materially alter or modify a plan made to end at date
fixed in § 221b. This changes the present law, see 6 CoLLMr: fi 11.11,
for the reasons stated under § 22lb, mupra. A clarifying change is
also made relative to a non-material alteration or modification.
Allowance of Claims After Order to Proceed with Banruptcy
238 (3) Filing period for claims not already filed changed from three to
six months after first date set for first meeting of creditors. This
conforms to § 57n.
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Effect of Order to Proceed with Bankruptcy-Unsecured Debts
239 (New section.) When after final time fixed under § 221b, judge
orders bankruptcy proceeded with, unsecured debts incurred after
time fixed in order under § 221b share on parity with prior un-
secured debts of the same class that are provable in bankruptcy;
the amount of these prior debts is reduced to the amount provided
for them in the plan. Chapters I to VII of Act, so far as con-
sistent with this section, are made applicable to determine rights
and liabilities of creditors who incurred debts after time fixed in
order under § 221b; for purposes of such application, order di-
recting that bankruptcy be proceeded with is regarded as date of
bankruptcy.
Orders to Be Transmitted to Securities
and Exchange Commission
265a (11) Clarifying change.
CHAPTER XI. ARRANGEMENTS
Allowance of Claims upon Order to Proceed with Bankruptcy
355 Filing period for claims not already filed changed from three to
six months after first date set for first meeting of creditors. This
conforms to § 57n.
No Adjudication against Wage Earner or Farmer without
Consent and Final Decree upon Dismissal of Petition
379 and 380 Renumbered to read "380" and "381". For criticism see under
§ 70h supra.
Effect of Order to Proceed with Bankruptcy
379 (New Section.) Paragraph (1) replaces what is needed to be
saved from § 70h, repealed, and provides that where after con-
firmation of arrangement, court orders bankruptcy proceeded
with, trustees is vested with title to debtor's property as of date of
entry of order. Paragraph (2) replaces, at the revised level of
sharing in the bankruptcy distribution, debts incurred after coti-
firmation (matter formerly dealt with by § 64b, repealed); and
paragraph (3) makes provisions of Chapters I to VII of the Act
generally applicable. These two paragraphs are patterned upon
§ 239, supra.
CHAPTER XII. REAL PROPERTY ARRANGEmENTS By PERSONS OTHER THAN CORPORATIONS
Allowance of Claims upon Order to Proceed with Bankruptcy
459 Filing period for claims not already filed changed from three to
six months after first date set for first meeting of creditors. This
conforms to § 57n.
No Adjudication against Wage Earner or Farmer without
Consent and Final Decree upon Dismissal of Petition
484 and 485 Renumbered to read "485" and "486." For criticism see under
§ 70h supra.
Effect of Order to Proceed with Bankruptcy
484 (New Section.) Identical to new § 379, supra.
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CHAPR XIII. WAGE EAiu~ns' Pi.A;s
Allowance of Claims upon Order to Proceed vith Bankruptcy
644 Filing period for claims not already filed changed from three to
six months after first date set for first meeting of creditors. This
conforms to § 57n.
Eclusive Method of Adjudication
668 Renumbered to read "669." For criticism of renumbering see under
§ 70h tpra.
Effect of Order to Proceed with Bankruptcy
668 (New Section.) Except for substituting the word "plan" for "ar-
rangeinent" the new section is identical to §§ 379 and 484, spra.
